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Views on the elements for the consideration of outputs component of the first global stocktake

Synthesis report by the secretariat

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I. Introduction and overview

A. Background and mandate

1. The global stocktake is the key mechanism under the Paris Agreement to ratchet up climate ambition and accelerate implementation. The stocktake reviews the implementation of the Agreement and assesses collective progress towards achieving its purpose and long-term goals in mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support; taking into account equity and on the basis of the best available science. The global stocktake may also take into account, as appropriate, efforts related to its work that (i) address the social and economic consequences and impacts of response measures and (ii) Avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

2. The global stocktake is carried out every five years. The first global stocktake commenced in 2021 and will conclude at COP 28. The outcome of the stocktake shall inform Parties in updating their national climate action plans and strategies, particularly their nationally determined contributions and enhance international cooperation for climate action.

3. The global stocktake in accordance with CMA decision 19/CMA.1 consists of the following three components:

(a) **Information collection and preparation**, focusing on gathering, compiling and synthesizing information and preparation for conducting the technical assessment,¹

(b) **Technical assessment**, focusing on taking stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, as well as opportunities for enhanced action and support to achieve its purpose and goals. The technical assessment entailed a technical dialogue which concluded with the publication of a synthesis report;²

(c) **Consideration of outputs** focusing on discussing the implications of the findings of the technical assessment with a view to achieving the outcome of informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action.

4. The CMA decision further outlined that the outcomes of the consideration of outputs component of the global stocktake should:

(a) Identify opportunities for and challenges in enhancing action and support for collective progress in relation to the thematic areas of the global stocktake (mitigation, adaptation, means of implementation and support, response measures, and loss and damage), as well as possible measures and good practices and international cooperation and related good practices;

(b) Summarize key political messages, including recommendations arising from the high-level events for strengthening action and enhancing support;

(c) Be referenced in a decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA and/or a declaration.

5. In support of the consideration of outputs component of the first global stocktake, the SB Chairs were mandated to convene an intersessional in-person workshop, to be held in October 2023, to develop elements for the consideration of outputs component of the first global stocktake, which will inform the work of the joint contact group on the first global stocktake. Further, the SB 58:

(a) Invited Parties and non-Party stakeholders to submit their views on the elements for the consideration of outputs component by 15 September 2023 via the

¹ Information collected is available at the GST information portal <https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake/information-portal> and searchable through the GST explorer <https://gst1.org/>

² FCCC/SB/2023/9, available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/631600>.

submission portal, taking into consideration the informal note by the chairs of the joint contact group,

(b) Requested the secretariat, under the guidance of the chairs of the subsidiary bodies, to prepare a synthesis report on the submissions and make it available on the UNFCCC website.

B. Scope and methodology of the report

6. This synthesis report is prepared by the secretariat under the guidance of the chairs of the subsidiary bodies and provides an analysis of submissions received by Parties and non-Party stakeholders in response to an invitation from SB 58.

7. Specifically, it synthesises views on the elements for the consideration of outputs component of the first global stocktake, taking into consideration the informal note by the co-chairs of the contact group on the indicative draft structure³ of the global stocktake CMA 5 decision.

8. The following terms are used in this report according to the percentage of Parties whose submissions mention particular information: “a few” for less than 10 per cent; “some” for 10–40 per cent; “many” for 41–70 per cent; “most” for 71–90 per cent; and “almost all” for more than 90 per cent. Please note that the above terminology does not apply to submissions made by non-Party stakeholders.

9. Following an overview, the report synthesizes the submissions along the indicative draft structure agreed at SB58. Most Parties followed the structure and headings and provided their views along the following concepts albeit the names of the sub-headings differed widely. This synthesis report uses the following without prejudging or prejudicing what Parties may ultimately agree on:

- (a) Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers;
- (b) Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress;

10. The report concludes with other issues submitted, including the proposed nature of the outcome.

11. The synthesis report focuses mainly on the submissions from Parties and also considers the submissions from non-Party stakeholders and uses terminology as provided by Parties.

12. Owing to time constraints in synthesizing a large volume of information and the urgency of publishing this report in advance of the GST workshop, the report could not undergo common quality assurance processes.

C. Overview of submissions received

13. As of 2 October 2023, submissions were received from 24 Parties on behalf of Party groups or individual Parties,⁴ representing 180 Parties and from 44 non-Party stakeholders⁵

³ Available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/IN.SBI58.i7_SBSTA58.i8.4.pdf.

⁴ Algeria on behalf of Arab Group; Australia; Brazil on behalf of BASIC; Brazil on behalf of ABU; Chile on behalf of Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Monaco, Peru, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom; China: Guatemala on behalf of AILAC; Cuba on behalf of the Group of 77 and China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Nepal; New Zealand; Norway; Russian Federation; Samoa on behalf of AOSIS; Saudi Arabia on behalf of LMDCs; Senegal on behalf of the LDCs; Spain and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and its Member States; Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group; Türkiye; UK, USA and Zambia on behalf of African Group of Negotiators.

⁵ AVIVA Investors, C2ES, CAN, CAN-LA, CEEW + Igst, Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) on behalf of Human Rights & Climate Change Working Group, Co-facilitators of the Ocean & Climate Change Dialogue, Conservation International on behalf of Nature4Climate Coalition,

expressing views on the elements for the consideration of outputs components of the first global stocktake totalling 787 pages (423 from Parties and 371 from non-Party stakeholders).

II. Synthesis of elements

A. Preamble

14. Nearly all the submissions from Parties reiterated the need for the preamble to recall relevant articles of the Convention and its Paris Agreement in relation to the first global stocktake. Many Parties emphasized on recognising it as a mechanism to course correct and reflect urgency to address ambition and implementation gaps. Most Parties also highlighted that the outcome welcomes the first global stocktake, reiterating commitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, and extends recognition of the contributions of the information collection and assessment, and technical assessment phases of the first global stocktake. Further, many Parties suggested that the preamble reflects relevant principles of the convention including the right to development, pursuit of sustainable development and eradication of poverty, principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and equity in the context of national circumstances and special needs and situations of least developed countries.

15. Many non-Party stakeholder reiterated that the global stocktake outcome affirm that Parties will respect, protect and fulfil obligations on human rights including the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children and youth, farmers, persons with disabilities, refugees, the LGBTQ+ community and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.

Possible elements

16. Recall Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, which provides the mandate and objective of the global stocktake.

17. Welcome the first global stocktake and recognise it as a mechanism to course correct, reflect urgency to address ambition and implementation gaps and continued multilateral commitment to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

18. Recall decision 19/CMA.1 which reflects guidance for the first global stocktake and affirm its objective as to inform the enhancing of climate action and support and international cooperation.

19. Recall Article 2 of the Paris Agreement and recognise that the global stocktake is crucial for the implementation of and towards the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris agreement, and ultimately the convention.

20. Recall Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement which reiterates the principle of CBDR-RC in light of national circumstances.

Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE), Friends of the Earth International, Friends World Committee for Consultation, Global Carbon Capture & Storage Institute, Humane Society International (HSI), ICLEI/LGMA, IDDRI, iGST, iGST (adaptation working group), IISD, IMO, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) + iGST, International Alliance to Combat Ocean Acidification (OA Alliance), International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), International Cryosphere Climate Initiative (ICCI), International Network for Sustainable Energy (INFORSE), International Oceanographic Organization, IUCN, Ocean & Climate Platform, Ocean Conservancy, OECD, Out for Sustainability, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) & iGST, Plymouth Marine Laboratory, Prakriti Resources centre, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), UN Climate Change High-Level Champions, UNICEF, UNIDO, UN-oceans, We Mean Business Coalition, WEDO, World Economic Forum, World Farmer's Organization, World Resources Institute and WWF.

21. Recall Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement whereby each Party shall communicate NDCs every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21.
22. Recall resolutions under UNCED, Rio Declaration, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development, and Resolution 47/195, Protection of global climate for present and future generation.
23. Recognize the integral role of holistic and comprehensive approaches that recognize human rights, biodiversity protection, food security, gender equality, synergies with sustainable development and poverty eradication efforts and just transition.
24. Reiterate that the global stocktake will be conducted in a comprehensive and facilitative manner, avoiding duplication of work, and taking into account the results of relevant work conducted under the Paris Agreement, the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
25. Recognize the best available science, and particularly recent IPCC findings, AR6, in informing climate action and support.
26. Extend appreciation to the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue for delivering the three technical dialogues and producing summary reports and the factual synthesis report.
27. Express appreciation to the high-level committee of the global stocktake for delivering high-level events, and to the ministerial co-facilitators, co-chairs of the Joint Contact Group, participating experts, Parties and non-Party stakeholders for their contributions to and engagement in the consideration of outputs of the global stocktake.
28. Welcome the input and engagement of non-Party Stakeholders including recognising their key role in delivering outcomes of the first global stocktake.

B. Context and cross-cutting considerations

29. Most Parties acknowledged that the context and cross-cutting consideration section of the global stocktake outcome should reflect the values of and underlying context for the first global stocktake, principles of the convention and its Paris Agreement including the significance of the Paris agreement, which has nearly universal participation and set in motion collective efforts for climate action. The recognition of the linkages of global response to climate change in the context of sustainable development, including the right to the same and efforts towards poverty eradication was reflected in the submissions of nearly all Parties.
30. Further, near all Parties called for the recognition of the fundamental linkage of climate change and action with other sectors and systems such as oceans, the cryosphere, biodiversity, forests and just transition. This recognition reaffirms that the global stocktake outcome will encourage synergistic actions to pursue co-benefits that address, for instance, the biodiversity crises, environmental pollution and elevate holistic approaches to climate change response.
31. Most Parties also emphasized that the global stocktake outcome takes into account the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, recognises the uneven geographic distribution of historic and cumulative emissions, acknowledges the differentiated responsibilities under the convention and the Paris Agreement, and that due to different contexts, there will be differentiated equitable pathways to achieving goals of the Paris Agreement.
32. Many Parties further highlighted other contextual elements to inform nationally determined actions to include human rights, intergenerational equity, gender equality and inclusion among others.
33. A recognition of global issues and challenges such as those related to trade and the COVID-19 pandemic were cited by many Parties. Further, some Parties specifically outlining that the global stocktake outcome is occurring amidst rising unilateralism, protectionism, and anti-globalism, and enabling environment for climate actions is undergoing critical challenges, including inadequate means of implementation support, sanctions on low-carbon

products and industries, restrictions on technology investment and cooperation, green barriers, discriminatory legislation and plurilateral constraint.

34. All Parties emphasized the significance of and made reference to equity and the best available science to be considered in a Party-driven and cross-cutting manner as reflected in decision 19/CMA.1. Below is an outline of proposals on how the two elements should be reflected in the global stocktake outcome:

Best available science

35. All submissions from Parties referenced science, acknowledging progress made in scientific understanding, with most Parties reflecting the IPCC AR6 as either a significant source of scientific knowledge or most comprehensive and best available science to date. Other Parties equated the references by IPCC AR6 to historical emissions as also forming the backward-looking element of the global stocktake outcome.

36. In considering the available science, some Parties also emphasized that modelled scenarios and pathways reflected and used in the IPCC AR6 are based on a range of assumptions, including socioeconomic variables and mitigation options. Such models and information should be used with careful recognition of the differentiated assumptions and outcomes and further take into account global equity, environmental justice and income distributions that is not fully integrated.

37. Some Parties stressed that the global stocktake outcome should not cherry-pick science and more so out of context; hence respecting all approaches, technologies, timelines and pathways. This includes not including new categorizations, sectoral targets, source-based measures, punitive or prescriptive measures and some called for scientific assessments that are unbiased.

Equity

38. Nearly all Parties referenced the reflection of equity in the global stocktake outcome, and more so considered it as a cross cutting element, pre-condition for a strong global stocktake outcome and basis for enhanced action and support. Some Parties highlight that equity considerations include a recognition of differentiated sustainable development needs and that sustainable development must be prioritised by the international community and within the first global stocktake. This includes recognition of the link with efforts to tackle economic, social, and structural inequalities within and among countries, while paving the way for just and equitable transitions towards low-carbon and climate resilient economies.

39. In defining equity, some Parties emphasized that developing countries who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected, and are limited to consuming the remaining carbon budget, reinforcing climate injustice hence. equity also implies an equitable sharing of the remaining carbon budget. Many Parties highlighted the need to acknowledge that global greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals.

40. Other Parties equated equity as a means to spur the highest level of ambition among Parties. In this context, some Parties highlighted that equity would be reflected in that all Parties, particularly those whose emissions are most consequential to keeping 1.5 °C within reach, have or strengthen their NDCs to reflect genuine efforts towards these goals. In addition, the most capable Parties, should lead in their ambition and advance global efforts including providing support to developing countries. This consideration of equity would take into account considerable changes that the world has undergone since 2015 in expanding the number of capable Parties.

41. Some Parties therefore proposed the need to establish a commonly agreed guidance to operationalise equity within the first global stocktake through inclusive equity indicators agreed by parties, and already reflected in parties' NDCs.

42. Many non-Party stakeholders supported notions on the critical role of the global stocktake outcome with fit-for-purpose and concrete recommendations and highlighted the

need to recognise the consequences of delayed action to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all. They recommended that the outcome recognises the role of non-Party stakeholders, businesses, indigenous communities and sub-national and local governments in the first global stocktake and in accelerating action; and affirm their continued participation in subsequent stocktakes. Many non-Party stakeholder also demonstrated the existence of a wealth of opportunities to support climate action, and transition towards low-emissions resilient societies and economies.

43. In recognising key sectors and elements for the global stocktake, some non-Party stakeholders highlighted that the outcome enables and enhances international cooperation, transparency and accountability, recognises the need to avoid ecosystem tipping points, safeguard food systems and recognise the role of oceans and other ecosystems. They therefore recommended that the global stocktake outcome includes new 2030 and 2035 benchmarks for actions including under just transition, food system transformation, protection of nature in an equitable manner.

44. Several non-Party stakeholders called for the inclusion of women, youth, indigenous Peoples, and local communities in the design and delivery of climate action to ensure a just transition for all.

45. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions emphasized the need for increased international cooperation and transparency in climate finance instruments to advance the implementation of nature-based solutions, sustainable agricultural practices, biodiversity conservation, and zero-deforestation commitments

46. Several non-Party stakeholders requests that Parties make greater efforts to integrate demand-side action and improved needs assessment into their NDC, and further incorporate in their updated NDC referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, and other relevant plans, strategies, reports, and instruments, and that GST outputs must collectively create the mechanisms and metrics needed to effectively inform and implement more equitable and ambitious NDCs which would be COP28's most important outcomes

47. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions stress the importance of ensuring intergenerational inclusion and intragenerational equity, and of meaningfully and equitably integrating youth voices and concerns in climate policy development and decision making

48. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions stressed the need to translating community-based research outputs into action, including policy change and transformation at national and sub-national levels, promoting the outcomes of the GST in a manner accessible to local communities and civil society by providing various options that are clear and usable with strong follow-up and accountability mechanisms to facilitate implementation

49. Several non-Party stakeholders suggest that the best available scientific knowledge should be taken into account when considering sufficiency policy actions and incorporating them into the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

50. A few of the non-Party stakeholders highlighted that there is still a notable lack of substantial involvement of LGBTQ+ individuals in climate change discussions and policymaking.

51. Several of the non-Party stakeholders emphasize the need to establish equity as a fundamental framework to assess the progress made by developed countries in delivering climate finance to developing regions.

Possible elements

52. Recognize synergies with processes within and beyond the Paris Agreement including sustainable development and other sectors and systems such as oceans, the cryosphere, biodiversity, forests and just transition including threats.

53. Acknowledge climate change as a common concern for mankind, recognise global interrelated challenges such as growing unilateralism, uneven recovery to the COVID-19 pandemic, rising energy and food prices, disruptions of global supply chains, fiscal pressure on developing countries, and importance of international cooperation.

54. Recognize the rapidly narrowing window for action, to raise ambition and implement existing commitments to limit warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and the cost of inaction as reflected by IPCC AR6.
55. Recognize that equity and the best available science will be considered in a party-driven and cross-cutting manner. Acknowledge that scientific understanding has significantly improved since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and confirms that urgent action is needed to keep 1.5 °C within reach which would substantially reduce projected losses and damages. Indicate that equity should inspire highest ambition and recognise differentiated circumstances. Recognise historic cumulative emissions and link between climate action and means of implementation as an equity consideration.
56. Acknowledge the significant changes that have been witnessed since the negotiations and adoption of the Paris Agreement, namely changing patterns of emissions and evolving capacity.
57. Recognize and welcome the IPCC AR6, as the most robust and comprehensive assessment of climate change to date, and as best available science.
58. Recognize the need to address pre-2020 implementation gaps in climate action and international cooperation under the Convention to promote climate action and implementation of the Convention and its Paris Agreement.
59. Reiterate and respect the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, recognising different capacities, priorities and contexts including social, political and economic conditions and resource endowments.
60. Take into account the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.
61. Recognize human rights considerations, people centred approaches, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity. Recognise climate change as a threat to human rights.
62. Emphasize the relevance of international cooperation including recognising the role of non-Party stakeholders to strengthen action, transparency and accountability. Invite non-Party stakeholders to also take transformative and concrete actions, make commitments and form partnerships to advance the Paris Agreement.
63. Recognize the importance of the enhanced transparency framework, recalling article 13 of the Paris Agreement, decision 18/CMA.1 and 14/CMA.4.
64. Highlight the importance of transparency and building political trust and confidence in the global climate framework as pre-condition for success. Strengthen multilateralism and emphasize the importance of integrated and balanced approach across aspects and methodologies to achieve Paris Agreement goals.
65. Call for Parties to collaborate and cooperate to promote a supportive and open economic system for sustainable economic growth and unilateral measures on climate action should not lead to discrimination or restriction to international trade.
66. Acknowledge the extensive scientific evidence highlighting that the ocean is inextricably connected to climate change, and that it is both an important element in the assessment of its impacts and a source of action. Urge Parties to increase synergistic actions to address climate change and the biodiversity and ocean crisis and acknowledge of the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity framework and the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Treaty (BBNJ).
67. Recommend the IPCC to fill research gaps and assess tipping points in the global climate system, and their consequences for adaptation and mitigation action.

C. Collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, including under Article 2, paragraph 1 (a-c), in the light of equity and the best available science, and informing Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, action and support

1. Mitigation

(i) *Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers*

68. While recognising the Paris agreement as a progressive mechanism for global climate action and milestone in multilateralism, near all Parties acknowledged that emissions are not in line with current modelled global mitigation pathways consistent with the long-term temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. **Absolute global emissions have continued to grow over the past three decades and net anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued to rise during the period 2010-2019 and based on current NDCs a 1.7 °C increase in warming is predicted.** In reflecting the long-term temperature goal, many Parties further highlighted the need to recognize that 2 °C temperature rise no longer aligns with the objectives of the UNFCCC and even temporary overshoot of the 1.5 °C threshold leads to additional permanent losses, beyond adaptation limits.

69. Some Parties also affirmed that there remains a significant ambition, implementation and practice gaps, whereby existing commitments, pledges and goals to date are not sufficient to limit warming. While all Parties have communicated their NDCs and growing number have communicated their LT-LEDs, the collective commitments are not consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal. Some Parties, for instance, highlighted that developed country NDCs and LTS- LEDS are not aligned to equity and need additional ambition with urgent reduction of emissions to compensate for their disproportionate use of the global carbon budget. Additionally, few Parties also cited a practice gap where parties have not taken on Paris-aligned efforts to reflect highest ambition in line of their respective circumstances.

70. In assessing collective progress, most Parties emphasized the need to take stock of pre-2020 progress, highlighting pre-2020 gaps in ambition and implementation, as a practical step towards understanding gaps in action, considering equity and enhancement of commitments. The outcome should recognise that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of GHGs has originated in developed countries and that the share of global emissions from developing countries will grow in order to meet their social and development needs. This recognition and acknowledgement was highlighted as fundamental to building trust and confidence and incentivizing all Parties to make contributions towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

71. Many Parties called for an outcome that acknowledges the progress made by developed and developing countries under the Paris Agreement. Some Parties highlighted that the outcome should note that expected mean global temperature increase decreased from 3.7 °C -4.8 °C to 2.1 °C-2.9 °C with current NDCs. Some Parties further demonstrated that the Paris temperature goal is now widely regarded as a reference point for climate action, including for non-Party stakeholders, who have widely adopted the net-zero concept. Specifically, wide efforts have been made to accelerate systemic transformations needed to reach net-zero through clean energy transitions and phase out of fossil fuels. Some Parties also highlighted the increase in ambition exhibited by developing countries, and recognise that support remains inadequate-as demonstrated by unfulfillment of needs under conditional NDCs.

72. As the Paris Agreement provides for progression, where successive NDCs reflect highest possible ambition, some Parties reiterated that this may translate to more rapid reductions through adopting stringent and comprehensive targets. There was acknowledgement and recognition that, as emissions have peaked in developed and some developing countries, but global emissions are yet to peak, all Parties need to undertake rapid and deep reductions in the decade after peaking. Many Parties therefore emphasized that NDCs should collectively reflect the ambition required to limit warming to 1.5 °C. Some

Parties highlighted that the outcome also affirm that developed countries have to continue to demonstrate leadership in these actions, noting their historical responsibilities.

73. Further, some Parties expressed that the global stocktake outcome notes with concern that some developed countries whose emissions already peaked decades ago, commit to achieving net zero GHG emissions only by 2050, which is simultaneous with the global timeframe and the targets of many developing countries, and recognizes that such commitments grossly lack in ambition. The outcome should also note practice in transferring emissions by trade (15% of annual OECD countries emissions) and the uneven distribution of consumption-based emissions.

74. Further, in assessing progress, few Parties acknowledged the difficulty of undertaking such an assessment before the first BTRs are introduced hence lacking understanding on the progress of NDCs, especially given the limited contribution of developing countries to the current transparency regime. For this reason, the ETF remains significant in assessing progress and informing ambition.

75. In their submissions, the non-Party stakeholders emphasized that the GST outcome must allow space for recognition and responsibility of historical responsibility, with the failure of pre-2020 commitments by developed countries resulting in significant ambition and implementation gaps which substantially affects the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the GST outcomes must allow space for debate on - and recognition of - historical responsibility and creating outcomes addressing it. A few of the non-Party stakeholders highlighted the substantial gap between projected global emissions under current NDC targets for 2030 and the emissions projected in modelled mitigation pathways required to limit warming to 1.5°C, and current policies are projected to result in higher GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs, indicating a significant implementation gap.

76. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions also highlighted that ocean related measures reported in the NDCs relate more often to adaptation and mitigation, and there needs to be inclusion of the growing recognition of mitigation co-benefits stemming from ocean-based adaptation actions, and the need to change mitigation measures on biodiversity, ecosystems and services to society and to enable the implementation of mitigation measures in a way that minimizes harm to biodiversity & marine resource users. They further noted that whilst mitigation measures have been well understood for decades, their deployment remains slow.

Possible elements

77. Welcoming efforts by Parties in strengthening and communicating NDCs (where 175 parties submitted NDCs and 64 submitted LT-LEDS), progress towards the temperature goal compared to pre-Paris business as usual scenarios and that various pledges would further limit warming to 1.7° by 2100, integration of climate change in development plans and legal frameworks, advancement and deployment of climate technologies reflected in decreasing unit costs, and appreciate the active engagement of non-Party stakeholders including civil society, youth, the private sector, local communities local and regional governments in addressing climate change.

78. Recognize that an increasing number of countries have peaked and reduced emissions and leading in transformational actions towards a low-carbon economy. Acknowledge that peaking will take longer for developing countries in consideration of their developmental needs.

79. Note that significant gaps exist in pre-2020 ambition and implementation, that 2030 and 2050 mitigation ambition of developed countries is inadequate. Further, recognise that historical emissions which led to the depletion of the carbon budget and mostly from the industrial revolution, and unfulfillment of commitments under the pre-2020 period are by developed countries and led to the mitigation gaps. Further recognise that historical and ongoing GHGs are distributed unfairly across regions, countries, and individuals.

80. Recognise that NDC commitments to date are not consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goals and NDCs updated since COP26 only partially offset emissions growth and are not yet in line with global modelled mitigation pathways. Further recognise inadequate 2030 mitigation ambition by developed countries.

81. Recognise that current global scale and support for abatement and removal technologies is not consistent with what is needed to limit warming in line with the long-term temperature goals.

82. Recognise soaring fossil fuel subsidies and ineffectiveness of Climate Agreements to deliver on fossil fuels: Commitments made in agreements like the Glasgow Pact have not curbed fossil fuel subsidies effectively as these agreements often lack monitoring mechanisms to assess their integration into national policies.

83. Recognise that each increment of global warming brings about intensified and concurrent hazards including the escalation of risks, adverse impacts, and related losses and damages associated with climate change as temperatures rise.

84. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions called for recognition that industry was responsible for 34 percent of GHG emissions in 2019, with emission growing faster since 2000 than in any other sector, and in 2022 accounted for a quarter of global energy system CO₂ emissions, with others estimating that GHG emissions from shipping in 2018 accounted for 2.89% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions and could represent between 90% and 130% of 2008 emissions by 2050.

(ii) *Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress*

85. Many Parties gave emphasis to a global stocktake outcome that outlines guiding actions and reiterates collective resolve to keep 1.5 °C within reach and in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, and simultaneously support sustainable development. Submissions from Parties emphasized for a global stocktake outcome that calls on and urges parties to undertake urgent and deep reductions in GHG emissions in this critical decade with the aim of keeping 1.5 °C in reach and avoid further irreversible impacts. Some parties also cited that the global stocktake outcome affirms that developed countries should take significant lead and demonstrate leadership in emissions reduction, operationalising equity and CBDR-RC. Additionally, some Parties emphasized that enhanced mitigation ambition will only be achieved by recognising that parties have different starting points and capacities.

86. Some Parties emphasised that the first global stocktake outcome should recognise that effective solutions to achieve the long-term temperature goals shall be nationally determined, dependent on national and regional circumstances. The outcome should acknowledge that a variety of mitigation options, technologies and solutions will need to be accelerated to limit warming in line with Paris Agreement goals, adopted in a nationally determined manner. Further, and according to the IPCC AR6, dynamic trade-offs and competing priorities exist between mitigation, adaptation, and development hence differential approaches should be recognised. In addition, scale up of solutions and technologies should not face discriminatory trade measures disrupting progress towards achieving the long-term temperature goals.

87. Some Parties also emphasized that the global stocktake outcome recognises that scale up of ambition and implementation of mitigation actions for developing countries will depend on adequacy of means of implementation and support from developed countries. In addition to enhancing the capacity of developing countries the support shall be utilised to prepare, communicate and account for their NDCs and mitigation actions.

88. The enhanced transparency framework (ETF) was highlighted by a few Parties as key to enhancing ambition and action, therefore some parties cited that the global stocktake outcome encourages Parties to prioritise development of Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). The outcome would further encourage all parties to set ambitious economy-wide targets for reducing emissions, include all GHG gases, sectors and categories in aligning their NDCs and LTS-LEDS with 1.5°C. According to some Parties, the provisions expressed above, would facilitate in ensuring highest possible ambition and represent a progression beyond the current NDCs. The global stocktake outcome should further recognise that any potential case of overshoot, as highlighted by a few Parties should launch a political dialogue to consider strengthening of NDCs, noting that overshoot increases risks to people and the planet.

89. Some Parties further highlighted the need to recognise that the Paris rulebook, including the tools to implement the Agreement, was only just concluded in 2021 and in order

to effectively judge its effectiveness, it must be allowed to run its course, without new processes that undermine the original intent, structure and agreed implementation rules of the Paris Agreement. According to these Parties, key vehicles of implementation, including the ETF and Article 6, were also agreed recently at COP26 and that all Parties are yet to submit their first transparency reports.

90. The mitigation work programme (MWP) was regarded by some Parties as an avenue to deliver on robust guidance and support in scaling mitigation ambition and action- noting that the elaboration of work under the work programme is still ongoing.

91. Almost all Parties proposed that the global stocktake outcome invite countries to provide an indication, in the NDC, on how their NDCs have been informed by outputs from the first global stocktake and how it aligns with the 1.5°C pathways. Many Parties strongly encouraged a global stocktake outcome with collective global targets, with some emphasizing that this is done without encroaching the self-determined nature of climate action. Many Parties therefore recommended for and proposed collective targets in the key areas such as renewables, energy efficiency and electric vehicles emphasizing that scaling renewables and phasing out fossil fuels are vital for just energy transitions to net zero emissions. In considering equity, some Parties emphasized on an outcome that invites Parties to contribute to emissions reduction efforts in a manner that reflects their past, current and future responsibilities while recognising the special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs.

92. Many non-Party stakeholders stressed the need to lead to rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global greenhouse gas emissions by 43 percent by 2030 and 60 percent by 2035 relative to the 2019 levels, and reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2050 globally, and emphasized the numerous reports in the IPCC's AR6 cycle that have documented the devastating reality of a 2 °C world. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions highlighted ways that sufficiency in policies could be included in NDCs, including initiatives that avoid the demand for energy and materials in buildings, to decrease global building emissions, as well as an aim to lower the demand for motorized transport and emissions, via 15-minute cities that limit distances to amenities.

93. The enhanced transparency framework (ETF) was highlighted by several non-Party stakeholders as key to enhancing ambition and action. Many non-Party stakeholders stated the GST outcome should urge parties to review and broaden their LT-LEDs to ensure alignment with the 1.5 pathways in a transparent manner. Several non-Party stakeholders also emphasized that credible, accountable and transparent actions by non-Party Stakeholder can strengthen efforts to rapidly decarbonise the global economy.

94. Several non-Party stakeholders emphasized that policies to green the transition sector must be enacted if countries are to achieve their NDCs, including renewables; concerted effort is required to reduce the cost of capital in developing countries to accelerate investment in renewables and electricity grid infrastructure, including mobilising non-Party stakeholders to help achieve renewable energy capacity at scale. Further, they highlighted that the global stocktake outcome must result in a renewed political commitment by including a just and equitable phase out of all fossil fuels, roll out of renewable energy alongside energy efficiency and demand side measures and call on a cease to all new oil, gas, and coal exploration and development and phasing out fossil fuel production before 2050. Several non-Party stakeholders highlighted the significant opportunities to reduce GHG emissions while reducing poverty and inequality by shifting public financial flows from fossil fuels to clean energy and targeted social protection.

95. Many non-Party stakeholders highlighted that there are significant gaps in incorporating agriculture and the food system into NDCs and that Parties should prioritize the reduction of GHG intense food production, and shift towards sustainable diets that conserve natural ecosystems in a way that upholds the rights of farmers and rural communities.

96. Several non-Party stakeholders also recognized that nature-based solutions can deliver up to a third of the mitigation needed by 2030 and expressed alarm with the rapid degradation of terrestrial, coastal, and marine ecosystems and the need to protect them; further highlighting the central role that indigenous peoples, farmers, marginalized genders and local communities play in ecosystem-based mitigation.

Possible elements

97. Encourage mitigation actions in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention and its Paris Agreement and that simultaneously deliver on Sustainable Development Goals and support efforts to eradicate poverty.
98. Call on and urge Parties to undertake urgent and deep reductions in GHG emissions in this critical decade with the aim of keeping 1.5° in reach and avoid further irreversible impacts. The GHG reduction actions from parties should be consistent with and reflect ambition required in order to reach 43% GHG emissions reductions by 2030, 60% by 2035, and 84% by 2050 respectively relative to 2019 levels.
99. Facilitate commitment towards global peaking of emissions at the earliest and by 2025, reach net zero CO₂ emissions by 2050, and net zero GHG emissions by early 2070's. Call for developed countries to reach net-zero considerably earlier than the global average and net-negative as soon as possible. Further stress that solutions that are cost-effective, actionable today and deployable at scale already exist. Urge Parties to also strengthen near-term and domestic actions, by realising existing and emerging opportunities including through responsive domestic policies and legislation.
100. Call for commitments from all Parties to reduce other GHG emissions, including reducing methane collectively by 30% by 2030 and 40% by 2035, noting their unequivocal role in reaching net-zero emissions. Additionally, reduce N₂O emissions by 13% and 17% by 2035 and further cut F-gases in line with the Kigali amendment and encourage all parties to ratify/join the Kigali Amendment.
101. Commend Parties that have revisited and strengthened their NDCs and invite Parties, especially those who have not done so; and in particular large emitters, to strengthen their 2030 targets, revisit NDCs and accelerate implementation in light of new available science and taking into account national circumstances. Parties to submit NDCs by 2035 and indicate how they are informed by the global stocktake outcome, 9 to 12 months ahead of COP30, and in time for the NDC synthesis report publication in 2025. Require that post-2030 NDCs are for the period 2031-35. Recognise support requirements to implement domestic mitigation measures.
102. Encourage Parties to also consider how they may reduce emissions related to activities outside their national inventories such as participation in measures related to international aviation, shipping or consumption related emissions.
103. Call for economy-wide targets for reducing emissions, include all GHG gases, sectors and categories in line with 1.5 °C. Urge Parties to review and communicate their LT-LEDs to ensure alignment with the 1.5 °C pathways and encourage those that have not done so to submit LT-LEDs by end of 2024. Thereafter, request the secretariate to publish an LT-LEDS synthesis report ahead of COP 29.
104. Reaffirm that collective mitigation ambition and implementation will continue in the context of CBDR-RC, equity and historical responsibility, with developed countries taking leadership in climate action and taking into account the special circumstances of developing countries, particularly LDCs and SIDS.
105. Support global collective goals, to be implemented in a nationally determined manner, to facilitate systematic transformations particularly just energy transitions and achieve net-zero emissions as follows:
- (a) Welcome efforts and call on Parties to triple the capacity deployment of renewable and clean energy by 2030. This includes setting up measures to accelerate the deployment of electricity network infrastructure, including scaling up investment in national and regional electricity networks, as a critical enabler of the clean energy transition.
 - (b) Support the doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvements (from 2.2% to over 4% annually) across sectors by 2030, reduce carbon intensity of buildings, increase rate of building retrofits to 3.5% by 2040 and reduce global average energy consumed per square meter in buildings by 45% by 2030 from 2021 levels. Ramping energy efficiency was cited as presenting multiple social and economic co-benefits, including creating jobs,

expanding energy access, decreasing air pollution, decreasing energy-related bills and diminishing reliance on fossil fuels.

(c) Call to Parties to support the doubling of low-carbon hydrogen production across sectors by 2030. Further, recognise role of natural gas as efficient transitional fuel.

(d) **Call on phase out of fossil fuels; support global commitment to accelerate the phase out of unabated fossil fuels as agreed at COP 26 and COP 27, and efforts to phase out inefficient fuel subsidies by 2025, supported by enabling environments and upscaling investments in renewable energy.**

(e) Support differentiated pathways for countries in pursuit of net zero and fossil fuel phase down where no further exploration of fossil fuel is targeted well ahead of 2030.

(f) End support for new unabated coal power generation and global phase out of unabated coal power generation by 2040 in a just manner. Request IPCC to suggest pathways on reduction of unabated coal use by 75% from 2019 levels by 2030 and request annual report on roadmaps and progress on the phasedown of unabated coal power.

(g) Encourage Parties to rapidly reduce process and energy emissions from industry, transport and other sectors, such as modal shift in transportation systems and increase share of zero emission vehicles. Calling for global transport-related CO₂ emissions to fall by 59% by 2050 relative to modelled 2020 emissions, but with regionally differentiated trends. Commitment to realise 100% zero emission on new light duty vehicle sales by 2035 in leading markets and 2040 globally and commitment to at least 30% of new medium and heavy-duty vehicle sales being zero emission by 2030 and 100% by 2040. Reduce carbon intensity of industries such as cement and steel, by 10-fold, to meet the Paris Agreement goals.

(h) Accelerate support towards efforts by parties and non-Party stakeholders to decarbonize the aviation and maritime sectors through low carbon technologies and sustainable aviation fuels. In aviation, through 2035, global aviation fuel efficiency measured in fuel/RTK improved by 1.42 to 1.60% per year. In maritime, reduce annual GHG emissions on a lifecycle basis by at least 37% by 2030 compared to a 2008 baseline and phase out GHG emissions from international shipping to zero emissions no later than 2050.

106. Recognise the role of carbon markets as an economy mechanism for GHG mitigation.

107. Acknowledge and support scale up of policy packages, innovations, all solutions and approaches to support emissions reduction, abatement and removal needed to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goals including carbon-dioxide management and removal technologies. Acknowledge that carbon-dioxide removal can fulfil three different complementary roles globally or at country level: lowering net CO₂ or net GHG emissions in the near term; counterbalancing 'hard-to-abate' residual emissions, and achieving net negative CO₂ or GHG emissions.

108. Encourage the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies and solutions on a large scale, including increasing scale of development and deployment of electric vehicles powered by low-GHG emissions electricity, supporting infrastructure, and batteries; and encouraging research, development, demonstration, deployment on a large scale, and international cooperation of carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) and CDR.

109. Supports the scaling up of nature-based solutions and ecosystem-based approaches for mitigation by reversing deforestation by 2030, namely set net-zero deforestation targets and significantly reduce other emissions from land use, by addressing main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Further support the adoption of policies to conserve and restore land carbon stocks and protect natural ecosystems, generating resilient communities, livelihoods, and landscapes, as a contribution to carbon storage and sequestration. Support efforts towards conservation of 30% of the earth's land, freshwater and ocean areas by 2030 in line with the Kunming-Montreal Global Diversity Framework.

110. Facilitate climate resilient, sustainable agriculture that increases yields and agroforestry, expands sustainable production systems, ensures food security and reduces agricultural GHGs emissions by 20%, and halve the share of food production lost and per capita food waste relative to 2017 by 2030. Recognize the role of enhancing sequestration in

the AFOLU sector, as it has the potential to deliver a third of the mitigation needed by 2030 and presents extensive adaptation benefits co-benefits.

111. Support efforts to reduce global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030, in recognition of the importance of cutting methane emissions as a quick and cost-effective tool to limit temperature rise to 1.5 °C.

112. Preserve and restore oceans and coastal ecosystem and scale ocean- based mitigation solutions, conservation and restoration of blue carbon ecosystems generating resilient communities, livelihoods, and landscapes, as a contribution to carbon storage and sequestration.

113. Support efforts towards and request transition to sustainable lifestyles, sustainable patterns of consumption, strengthening circular economy and sustainable tourism.

114. Accelerate the implementation of existing technology while fostering disruptive technological solutions across all key economic sectors including scaling up of GHG reduction technologies.

115. Recognize cross-sectoral responsibility in GHG mitigation is fundamental an achieved through establishing public-private institutional arrangements, quantifying the required resources, and raising awareness among decision-makers regarding the co-benefits of decarbonization.

116. Facilitate establishment of a work programme that supports implementation of NDCs in line with the outcomes. Further enhance cooperation and sharing of good practices, through a dedicated space for Parties to exchange lessons learned on NDC best practices, including based on global stocktake outcomes. Such an exercise extends to capacity building and collaboration across existing mandates of the UNFCCC.

117. Invite the IPCC to provide a special report in its Seventh Assessment Report on respective social-economic costs, conditions, needs and implications of limiting global warming to well below 2 °C and pursuing efforts to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, including those of the relevant modelled pathways.

118. Several non-Party stakeholders also indicated that the global stocktake outcome should highlight that additional incentives are required to scale up carbon-capture-storage deployment to meet global goals, as this deployment will create and sustain jobs that have historically relied on high-emission industries, whilst providing deep carbonization and a financially smart climate solutions.

2. Adaptation

119. Nearly all Parties emphasized for a global stocktake outcome that recognizes the rising ambition and efforts undertaken by Parties, particularly developing countries towards enhancing adaptive capacity and reducing vulnerability. This has been demonstrated through dedicated domestic financing, and a variety of context-specific national and local-level actions evidenced through improved planning, communication, policies, legal frameworks and programmes- with nearly 84% of parties having at least one adaptation planning instrument and more than 170 countries including adaptation in their climate policies and planning processes. Many Parties acknowledged the role of the Glasgow- Sharm el Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation (GGA) in assessing progress and enhancing collective action.

120. Specifically, most Parties acknowledged that developing countries are engaged in the development and implementation of national adaptation plans (NAPs), articulating greater ambition; reported adaptation actions and pursued adaptation actions across a multitude of sectors including agriculture, food security, biodiversity, forestry, freshwater resources, urban development, housing, waste management and health. In these communications, adaptation is reflected in consideration of other sectors and aligned with national climate resilience and development agendas.

121. In assessing collective progress, many Parties called for recognition that adaptation is no longer a matter of choice, but a matter of urgency in the face of intensifying climate impacts and delayed actions and support would deepen and hinder progress on sustainable

development. Many Parties therefore called for the global stocktake outcome to recognise that most current climate risks will continue, and global warming of 1.5° to 2° will still result in extreme impacts, making adaptation less effective, particularly for food security, slowing economic growth and increasing levels of poverty.

122. Many Parties also called for the global stocktake outcome to acknowledge with concern the insufficient extent of action and recognise that gaps in implementation and ambition are primarily due to finance, technological and capacity constraints. Most Parties emphasized that the outcome should further note that efforts for adaptation remain fragmented, incremental, sector specific and uneven across regions.

123. The assessment of effectiveness and efficiency of adaptation practices and measures was also highlighted by many Parties. Parties elaborated that current evidence affirms that there is no one approach for adaptation nor measuring adaptation progress and this lack of comparability prevents easy comparisons of progress on adaptation. With this, Parties highlighted that the global stocktake outcome recognises that measuring progress against the global goal on adaptation is not about progress to a fixed state but be based on understanding of an evaluation progress across stages of the adaptation policy cycle and improving previous efforts. In this context, assessing progress towards Article 7.2 of the Paris Agreement some Parties recommended that the global stocktake outcome should be aligned with the GGA's proposed components of progress: adaptive capacity, vulnerability and resilience.

124. Adequate and scalable finance was listed as key enabler for enhancing adaptation by many Parties, and the global stocktake outcome should recognise the gaps in availability and access and urgent need to rapidly scale-up finance for adaptation.

125. Many non-Party stakeholders acknowledged the collective progress on adaptation and efforts led by Parties for instance inclusion of ecosystem-based adaptation approaches into their NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDs, but noted that progress is insufficient to protect communities and ecosystems. Near all submissions also recognized the outcomes of the GGA, which enables accelerated progress on adaptation action, and advances ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions. To assess adaptation progress, many submissions from non-Party stakeholders emphasized on reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation metrics and role of collective metrics.

126. In their submissions, non-Party stakeholders recognised gaps in financing for adaptation called for an urgent increase in support towards and enhancing adaptation and resilience finance flows, accessibility and appropriate instruments to accelerating near-term adaptation solutions for vulnerable and marginalised populations.

Possible elements

127. Recognize the growing adaptation ambition and efforts, including dedication of domestic adaptation finance, undertaken by Parties, particularly developing countries towards climate adaptation and strengthening resilience across sectors. Acknowledge efforts by Parties towards developing, implementing and communication NAPs, and increased efforts to align adaptation with national development plans.

128. Recognize reduced risks in specific places and for certain hazards, notably regarding flood and heat vulnerability. Furthermore, there are indicators of a decrease in global vulnerability, especially concerning flood risk and extreme heat.

129. Recognize increasing political momentum and action in strengthening of early warning systems (EWS) through multi stakeholder initiatives such as the Early Warning for All initiative. Highlight urgency in addressing gaps in the global climate observing systems, gauging progress by 2028, with a focus on developing countries.

130. Recognize urgency and global nature of adaptation, as climate change has posed adverse impacts on the economy and key economic sectors such as food production, biodiversity, human health, and economic growth. Recognise that warming will increase risks and make adaptation less effective.

131. Acknowledge with concern the insufficient extent and gaps in adaptation action and note that efforts for adaptation remain fragmented, incremental, sector specific and uneven across regions.

132. Note with concern the gaps in availability and access to adaptation finance; recognise that the share of adaptation finance against total climate finance remains low (increased from 20% in 2017-2018 to 28% in 2019-2020) and note the growing needs for developing countries.

133. Acknowledge gaps in the collective assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of adaptation practices and call to align assessments with adaptation policy cycle and GGA framework: on risks and vulnerabilities, implementation, and finance.

(ii) *Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress*

134. Many Parties reiterated that the global stocktake recommendations and guidance on adaptation recognises the intrinsic links between adaptation and sustainable development, where sustainable development enhances adaptive capacity and adaptation enables sustainable development in return. According to these Parties, the global stocktake outcome should further emphasize the urgency of climate adaptation, recognising the shared vulnerabilities and the need to keep the long-term temperature goal to avoid further consequences. Some Parties also stressed that the global stocktake outcome acknowledge that adaptation measures need to be transformative and emphasize on the importance and role of locally-led adaptation action.

135. Many Parties highlighted that role of the GGA and acknowledged that while outcomes of the GGA work programme will not be finalized in time to be considered for the first global stocktake outcome, elements of the framework and the UNEP Adaptation gap report could provide insights on key messages to enhance implementation of adaptation. Many Parties emphasized that the synergy of the global stocktake outcome and with outcomes from the GGA work programme should facilitate the operationalization of the goal and strengthening climate resilience.

136. Many Parties further indicated that the global stocktake outcome should emphasize the existing gaps between increasing needs to tackle climate change effects and current global capacity and highlight the necessity of providing adequate means of implementation and support. Many Parties stressed that primarily, many adaptation interventions provide no adequate financial return on investment and therefore should be funded with grants and high concessional public finance.

137. Non-Party stakeholders emphasized that adaptation action should be informed and driven by local contexts, recognise and respond to transboundary risks, be transformational and enabled through rights-based and gender-responsive approaches focusing on equity and inclusivity. They further highlighted the need for collaboration with non-Party stakeholders and the emphasized on the role of private sector to deliver and support climate resilience across sectors. Some non-Party stakeholders specifically highlighted the need for prioritising children and populations that are vulnerable to climate impacts, marginalised and support.

138. Many submissions therefore recommended approaches with high potential for sustainable food production, reducing food loss and waste, shifting towards healthy and sustainable diets and nutrition, and conserving and restoring ecosystems. The role of marine ecosystems was extensively cited as key to advancing adaptation therefore calling for efforts to reduce pressures on marine environments. Some non-Party stakeholders also called for the delivery of resilient shelter and infrastructure systems for urban, rural and coastal settlements.

Possible elements

139. Recognise the urgency of adaptation action and support.

140. Call for all countries to have and update National Adaptation Plans which address the country specific key climatic risks by 2030, and encourage countries to submit Adaptation Communications by 2025 and update them regularly to allow for improved assessment of progress before the second global stocktake.

141. Recognise the GGA and include placeholder to incorporate outcomes from the GGA framework. Recommend establishing an ongoing new joint SBI and SBSTA and CMA agenda item on the GGA as this is inevitable for the achievement of the global goal.

142. Call on Parties to commit to the implementation of the GGA framework and particularly NAPs in line with national plans and priorities through the following elements:

(a) Recognition that effective risk and vulnerability assessments can protect lives and safeguard livelihoods and include a call to integrate climate risk reduction in planning and implementation and advance research on the same.

(b) Recognise cross border and transboundary risks such as water utilisation, global supply chains and international food markets and support joint programmes to address these systemic risks.

(c) Effective planning for locally-led adaptation action, recognition of principles for locally-led adaptation.

143. Recognize the important role of local communities and indigenous peoples, in addition to Parties, in delivering locally-appropriate adaptation action.

144. Propose development of a new global “Adaptation Synthesis Report” ahead of the second GST, bringing together the necessary information coming out from the framework for the GGA and Parties’ reporting, and provide new information related to adaptation, including on progress on global priorities and targets, national targets/priorities, enablers, policies and plans, and external factors.

145. Reaffirm the importance of adaptation communications and National Adaptation plans as strategic tools for adaptation plans and understanding of progress towards adaptation.

146. Call for all countries to have and update NAPs which address the country specific key risks of climate change by 2030 and submit Adaptation Communications and further encourage Parties’ adaptation plans to be inclusive, informed, long -term and with sustainable development and mitigation co-benefits and synergies.

147. Encourage Parties to mainstream adaptation into all plans, budgets, policies, strategies systems and sectors and advancing climate resilient development. Support integration of climate risk and impacts into the design of different systems, integrating climate risk and impacts into the design of infrastructure, water, health, food and nature-based solutions. Support the delivery of resilient infrastructure systems for urban, rural and coastal settlements. In advancing climate-resilient development, countries will accelerate Sustainable Development Goals, reduce poverty and hunger, improve health and livelihoods, and improve access to clean water and energy.

148. Support and welcome the Glasgow Climate Pact call to developed countries to scale up and double their collective provision of finance for adaptation from 2019 levels by 2025; emphasize that adaptation finance is in the form of public grants or high concessional public finance and ensure balance between mitigation and adaptation finance and call for ramping up adaptation finance to USD 400 billion per annum by 2030, primarily from public grants and budgetary support efficient allocation using pre-existing national initiatives – rather than a project-based approach to adaptation.

149. Call for simplified access to financial resources for adaptation finance and support efforts of achieving at least 50% allocation of finance for adaptation in the finance mechanism by 2025.

150. Stress the significance and urgency of support measures to developing countries to design and deliver NAPs that reflect reforms and plans to integrate climate risks into all aspects of planning, decision making and implementation and recognize that the extent to which developing countries will fully implement their adaptation plans is dependent and relative to the provision of means of implementation and considerations related to efforts towards sustainable development and poverty eradication.

151. Recognize the critical role of climate information and services coupled with early warning systems and support efforts towards universal coverage of early warning systems and access to climate information and services by 2027. Further provide universal climate service coverage for priority climate-sensitive sectors like agriculture, food security, health, disaster risk reduction, energy, and water by 2030. Recognise that quality observations,

monitoring and forecasting are key to decision making and long-term action, understanding climate risks and vulnerabilities.

152. Recognize the roles of various built, ecosystems and nature-based solutions in advancing adaptation and sustainable development, such as forests, oceans, land use, food systems and water and therefore:

(a) Support efforts to halt deforestation by 2030 and recognise that healthy forest systems and reducing deforestation and forest degradation delivers adaptation and environmental co-benefits;

(b) Recognize and welcome the work of the ocean climate dialogue and reiterate the invitation in decision 1/CP.26 para. 60 to integrate and strengthen ocean-based action in their existing work;

(c) Call for attention and efforts to increase climate resilience in agriculture and food systems through increased policy action, innovation and investments and boosts yields by 17% by 2030. Further encourage building more climate-resilient food systems by improving productivity, output diversity and nutrition and lowering farm-level GHGs by 21% by 2030; halve, compared to 2019, the share of food lost in production and per capita food waste, while transitioning to healthier and plant-based diets;

(d) Encourage Parties to pursue innovation and coordinated policy action in land use in order to reduce emissions, restore biodiversity and increase productivity. Promoting, designing and adopting integrated approaches that harmonise and promote synergies between competing land-uses;

(e) Encourage actions that support improvements in water storage capacity, efficiency, and quality through improved management and nature-based solutions and to build resilience to droughts.

153. Recognise the need to proactively screen for and minimize maladaptation to avoid locking-in vulnerabilities, exacerbating inequalities and ensuring long-term benefits.

154. Stress the importance of knowledge, best practices, know-how sharing, and awareness to address adaptation challenges, especially in developing countries. This includes research on climate risks, impacts, and vulnerabilities to enhance the ability to adapt to climate change.

155. Encourage countries to support the assessment, monitoring and evaluation of domestic adaptation progress to enhance accountability and facilitate cooperation to share good practices, latest research and lessons. Emphasize urgent need to shift from plan-based reporting to gauging effectiveness through comprehensiveness, inclusivity, implementability, multiple levels of integration, and monitoring.

156. Call on the scientific community, including the IPCC to contribute to regional assessments of adaptive capacity, adaptation and resilience ability, with short and long-term solutions, mapped across different temperature goals. including with a focus on the GGA, including challenges, needs, costs, and pathways towards achieving it.

157. Invite the IPCC to provide a special report in its Seventh Assessment Report on the global goal on adaptation, including challenges, needs, costs and pathways towards achieving it, and call upon the research community to further the understanding of global, regional and local impacts of climate change, response options and adaptation needs.

3. Alt 1 Finance flows and means of implementation and support

Alt 2 Means of implementation and support, including finance flows

Alt 3 Means of implementation and support (included finance flows in finance)

Alt 4 a) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate and b) Means of implementation and support

158. All Parties provided views on finance, financial flows, technology and capacity building using any of the four headings. For the purpose of this synthesis report and without prejudging and without prejudice to the final agreement of Parties, this report organizes the views provided by Parties as follows:

(a) Finance and finance flows;

- (b) Technology development and transfer;
- (c) Capacity-building.

159. Many Parties provided overarching views on this topic with the following possible elements:

(a) Recognize that enhancing means of implementation and support, including scaling-up finance and financial support, continues to be a critical enabler for achieving the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;

(b) Reaffirm delivery of obligations and commitments by developed countries to provide and mobilize means of implementation and support, so as to enable the actual delivery of concrete mitigation results at the national level.

160. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions reiterate the need for immediate, rapid and sustained provisions of means of implementation for developing country Parties to transition to implementation, the need to focus on needs-based assessments, and ensure scale of collective pledges and means of implementation can be transparently and meaningfully compared to the demands of both science and equity, in light of common but differentiated responsibilities.

(a) Finance and finance flows

161. All Parties submitted views on finance and/or finance flows.

(ii) Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers

162. As part of backward looking, Parties provided their views on progress made, including related to the USD 100 billion goal. While a few Parties underlined that the USD 100 billion goal is not just quantitative but also relates to meaningful implementation of mitigation and transparency, other Parties raised issues related to accounting progress towards the USD 100 billion noting the lack of an agreed definition of climate finance. Many Parties also provided views on progress made in the delivery of commitments by developed countries and pointed to remaining barriers and gaps in the quantity and quality of available finance for developing countries. Parties also elaborated on gaps in thematic and geographic allocation of finance and finance flows, example adaptation and developing countries receiving less finance compared to mitigation and developed countries. Many Parties also shared views on the quality of finance, including access and the different finance instruments such as grants and loans.

163. As part of backwards looking, some non-Party stakeholders noted with concern the significant financing gap for the AFOLU sector and the slow operationalization of Article 6, whilst recognizing the need to address capacity, policy, and institutional gaps to enable and accelerate national and collective action for implementing nature-based solutions, and the importance of incorporating Indigenous and traditional knowledge systems for long-term capacity development, with others highlighting the limited funds to support child-responsive programmes.

164. Many non-Party stakeholders highlighted the need to assess the progress made by developed countries to deliver climate finance to developing regions, noting that the quantum and quality of climate finance flows should be based on the differential national circumstances of developed and developing countries.

165. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions noted with concern the significant financing gap for climate action including the AFOLU sector and the slow operationalization of Article 6. Many non-Party stakeholders called on developed countries to commit to provide adequate finance and other means of implementation to enable developing countries to pursue sustainable development and climate action.

Possible elements

Overall progress

166. Recognize progress made under the Paris Agreement on climate finance and finance flows, due to significant efforts from both developing and developed countries, the public and the private sector, for example:

(a) The GCF has channelled USD 12.8bn in the GCF-1 period (2020-2023), and by the time of COP28 will have completed a second replenishment round,

(b) The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) estimates that as of 2019-2020, an annual average of USD 803 bn of climate finance is flowing;

(c) The scale-up in finance provision and mobilisation has been significant, with the IEA now estimating USD 1.7tn worldwide going just to clean energy;

(d) A growing number of countries have started implementing policies to align financial flows by among other things - defining frameworks to catalyse the interest of the private sector in orienting financial flows towards the Paris Agreement long-term goals, including through emissions pricing, and recognizing that there is a rapidly growing interest of both the public and the private financial sector (including final consumers) to invest in a financial market aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement;

(e) Financial institutions representing over USD 130 trillion in assets committed to net zero pathways under the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ);

(f) Improved effectiveness and impacts of climate finance from both recipient and provider perspectives.

167. Recognize that progress, including related to the increase in private finance, has been uneven across sectors, regions, and actors and that developed countries have disproportionately benefitted from this increase.

168. Significant opportunities remain to accelerate and enhance alignment of financial flows, including related to:

(a) Creating the demand for climate-smart investments, primarily through policies and measures;

(b) Increasing the supply of finance by mobilizing capital from all sources, public and private, international and domestic;

(c) Managing climate-related financial risks across investment portfolios and assets.

Progress on the USD 100 billion goal

169. Recognize that the USD 100 billion goal has played an important role in inspiring Parties to the Paris Agreement to mobilize resources and support the efforts of developing countries to take ambitious mitigation action and build climate resilience noting that the commitment to the goal is not in the Paris Agreement.

170. Welcome the progress made by developed countries towards achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year to address the needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.

171. Acknowledge that the \$100 billion goal was not delivered in 2020 but is expected to be delivered in 2023.

172. Note that there is consensus across all climate finance aggregators and reports, that developed countries have failed to deliver on this commitment in 2020 and proceeding years.

173. Note with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation has not yet been met 14 years after they were set; further notes that estimates show that in 2020 the real value of financial support by developed countries specifically aimed at climate action was only around USD 21 billion to USD 24.5 billion, much less than the officially reported USD 83.3billion in 2020.

174. Recognize that it is essential to consider all three dimensions of the USD 100 billion goal (i.e., mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and through to 2025;

addressing the needs of developing countries; and the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation). While there has been significant focus on the first dimension, there has been remarkably less on dimensions two and three.

Progress on transparency and reporting

175. Note the reports produced in 2023 by the OECD and SCF on adaptation finance and mobilizing private finance.

176. Note the inconsistencies shown between the OECD and Oxfam Reports.

177. Express serious concern on the transparency of financial resources provided and mobilized by developed countries, including double counting and labelling.

178. Recognize that due to the lack of a multilaterally agreed definition on climate finance, it has not been possible to consistently track and report progress on climate finance delivery to date.

179. Note progress made on tracking private finance flows.

180. Note that as with public funding, the divergence in accounting methodologies makes it difficult to accurately aggregate the amounts of private climate finance.

Progress on delivery of commitments

181. Note that the historical responsibility of developed countries and unfulfillment of pre-2020 commitments, including the achievement of mitigation goals and provision of means of implementation to developing countries, in particular finance, must be addressed seriously in the context of the GST in a cross-cutting manner.

182. Recognize the obligation of developed country Parties to provide and mobilize climate finance pursuant to Article 9 of the Paris Agreement LDCs with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.

183. Note gaps in meeting commitments, quantity and quality of finance.

184. Recognize that issues surrounding transparency, progress and delivery of climate finance commitments of developed countries, namely the USD 100 billion goal, undermine trust in the process and represent an impediment to implementation in developing countries.

185. Recognize that a lack of burden sharing within developed countries has resulted in a system of financial support within which some developed countries are delivering their fair share and others have not provided adequate support to developing countries.

Barriers and gaps in meeting finance needs and aligning finance flows

186. Acknowledge that estimates of developing country needs vary, but all show that those needs far outweigh current finance flows. For example, the Songwe-Stern report estimates the developing country needs (excluding China) will be USD 2-2.8 trillion by 2030 with other estimates being USD 5.8-5.9 trillion for the pre-2030 period and needs identified in National Communications of developing countries indicate USD 9 trillion and almost USD 6 trillion to implement their NDCs.

187. Note that about USD4 trillion per year need to be invested in renewable energy up until 2030 to be able to reach net zero emissions by 2050, and that, furthermore, a global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investment of at least USD 4-6 trillion per year.

188. Recognize that climate finance flows required in both quantitative and qualitative terms are not commensurate with the needs and priorities of developing countries or aligned with recommended pathways for 1.5 °C temperature goal.

189. Recognize domestic financing mechanisms of developing countries alone are insufficient to meet the scale of interventions required to attain the 1.5/2 degrees Celsius temperature limit including meeting the rising cost of adaptation and losses and damages.

190. Recognize that the financial entities under the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund remain small and underfunded to provide adequate, sustainable, predictable

and accessible climate finance to developing countries to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.

191. Recognize that the role of the GCF and its partner institutions to advance country ownership and countries' evolving needs remains poor. A comprehensive approach to direct access to meet countries' climate priorities based on 'country drivenness' is missing. While the GEF has demonstrated progress, it remains a small fraction of the overall climate finance landscape, including when considered alongside the GCF.

192. Recognize that current budgetary processes within developed countries represent a barrier to scaling up the public finance needed in developing countries.

193. Recognize that there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gaps, but persistent misallocation of capital and barriers to directing financial flows to climate action must be overcome. Aligning financial flows is synonymous with unlocking the trillions of dollars needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Gaps in thematic and geographic allocation of finance and finance flows

194. Recognize that finance provided failed to reach parity between mitigation and adaptation.

195. Note the failure to implement COP decisions for addressing finance for alternative approaches such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches.

196. Recognize that there exists an evident geographical disproportion in climate financing. The scales are tipped heavily in favour of economically prosperous regions, leaving developing areas, like Latin America, grappling with resource scarcity despite facing the brunt of climate impacts.

197. Recognize that there is a need for new and additional finances as envisaged under Articles 9.3 and 9.5 of the Paris Agreement, over and above the promised amount of financial assistance being mobilized, including clarity about what counts as 'new and additional' climate finance.

198. Recognize that the global financial system places a higher risk premium on developing countries borrowing and investment, based on perception, further constraining capital on already small underdeveloped financial market.

199. Recognize that actors within the financial sector and outside of the UNFCCC process have not integrated equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities into their climate finance approaches. This has resulted in highly inequitable distribution of climate finance provided, top-down approaches that have negatively impacted developing countries, and non-inclusive practices that have restricted finance to those that require it the most. The gap is highlighted in the fact that according to Morningstar Direct, ESG investment assets are concentrated in Europe (81%) and the United States (13%).

Quality of finance

200. Acknowledge that the quality of finance provided is important and that too often concessional finance and grants have not been targeted where the needs are greatest.

201. Recognize that current instruments are mainly debt-related (loans), which is leading to an increase in levels of indebtedness in a context of limited fiscal space, that in turn is leading to increasing risks and costs of finance. A transformative shift towards grants and non-debt instruments would ensure more sustainable financial support.

202. Appreciate the need to consider access, noting that there has been significant progress to simplify approvals, promote a programmatic approach and enhance capacity building to support enabling environments and institutional capacity.

203. Recognize that while the operating entities of the financial mechanism have achieved progress over the years, access remains an issue for many developing countries. Despite over seven years since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, not all developing countries requesting support from the operating entities have been able to access support.

204. Recognize that modalities, including Direct Access, have been successful in improving access, and encouragement of such mechanisms to improve access further.

205. Welcome the recent Summit for a New Global Financing Pact as an important moment to recognise that climate finance should be deployed so as to limit the debt burden of climate action wherever possible, and provides a unique opportunity to ensure needs can be met through climate finance delivery.

(iii) *Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress*

206. As part of the forward looking, Parties elaborated on how to align finance flows and how to scale up finance for developing countries taking into account their needs and equity. While many Parties emphasize the role of developed countries in mobilizing finance, some Parties call for developed countries and other Parties in a position to do so to mobilize finance. Many Parties provided their views on the New Collective Quantified Goal with some wanting to provide direction and others caution against pre-empting the outcome and the consideration under the dedicated work programme. Parties also made proposals on thematic and geographic allocations of finance and direction of financial flows as well as the quality of finance. The reform of the global financial architecture, including the MDBs, was highlighted by many, along with different policy instruments to align financial flows. Finally, Parties made proposals to enhance reporting and agreeing on a definition of climate finance as well as to continue the work post-GST.

207. Some non-Party stakeholders also emphasized that the global stocktake outcome strengthens action and provision of new climate finance (on top of meeting 0.7% of GNI for ODA), sets a trajectory for finance and support, backed by credible commitments including assesses progress made by private finance towards. Many non-Party stakeholders reiterated the need to support the mobilisation of finance towards ocean-based climate solutions, food systems and called for the reform of MDBs and review of international financial architecture.

208. Further, several non-Party stakeholders highlighted that the GST outcome should outline strategies to optimize the quality and focus of climate finance provision with a strong emphasis on achieving an appropriate balance between adaptation and mitigation investments. Non-Party stakeholders also highlighted the need to make finance easily accessible with the use of innovative funding arrangements that don't put additional burdens on developing countries and the need to reduce the cost of capital to attract commercial investment at scale for emerging economies and vulnerable communities, whilst reforming free-trade negotiations to reduce barriers, as well as coordinated carbon pricing policies & removal of fossil fuel subsidies. Many also supported the alignment of finance flows with Paris Agreement goals such as through ensuring public finance is redirected to clean energy infrastructure, low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development.

Possible elements

Align finance flows

209. Reiterate Articles 2 and 9 of the Paris Agreement, highlighting the importance of enhancing finance flows towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development from developed to developing countries, with a balance in mitigation and adaptation towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

210. Acknowledge that a renewed focus on a broader set of finance flows is required to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. Further action needs to be taken by developed countries to ensure finance is flowing to where the needs are the greatest.

211. Make financial flows (from international and domestic, public and private sources) consistent with low emissions and climate resilient development and significantly increase the financial flows to developing countries.

212. Acknowledge that limited alignment of investment activity with the Paris Agreement will result in significant carbon lock-ins, stranded assets, and other additional costs and urge parties to step up efforts to address these risks.

213. Firmly commit to accelerate government action to mobilise private capital.

214. Call on finance to take into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties and represent a progression beyond previous efforts.

215. Call on Parties to continue to take steps to create the demand for Paris-aligned investments and at the same time, Parties should undertake efforts to reduce the demand for investments that are not Paris-aligned.

Scale up finance

216. Recognize that the quantity and quality of finance in support of pathways towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development must be based on the needs and priorities of developing countries.

217. Emphasize the need to continue to scale up affordable long-term finance.

218. Reiterate and urge developed country Parties to provide new, additional, public, grant-based and concessional financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.

219. Call on developed country Parties to continue to increase the mobilization and provision of financial support to developing country parties to implement the Paris Agreement.

220. Reaffirm and urge developed countries to immediately and fully deliver the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion climate finance per year by 2020 and annually through 2025 urgently, and make up for the shortfalls in years where it has not been met, to reduce the gaps to meet the increasing needs of climate finance by developing countries.

221. Urge developed countries to commit to climate finance that goes well beyond USD 100 billion per year to match the trillions of USD needed annually by developing countries for mitigation and adaptation action and to take into account the outcome of the GST.

222. Highlight the expectation that the USD 100 billion climate finance goal will be met in 2023, noting the data to confirm this will be available in 2025.

223. Call on all countries to continue to increase efforts to enable the full delivery on the USD 100 billion goal as soon as possible across all three of its dimensions:

(a) For contributors, this includes through efforts to scale up public finance, redoubling efforts to mobilize private finance, engaging new climate finance contributors, and continuing to explore innovative sources of finance;

(b) For recipients, this includes continuing to improve the demand for climate finance, developing relevant capacities, strengthening domestic enabling environments, including through policies and measures, and developing robust pipelines of bankable projects, and submitting timely biennial reports.

224. Recognize that future approaches must learn the lessons of the USD 100 billion, foster trust and must be designed to keep us on track for delivery under the Paris Agreement.

225. Call on the GST to create a clear burden sharing mechanism between developed countries in relation to their commitment to provide financial support towards achieving the low and climate-resilient development.

226. Advance in the replenishment of multilateral channels that support climate action in developing countries.

227. Urge developed country Parties to provide resources for the second replenishment of the GCF while demonstrating progression over previous replenishment and in line with the programming capacity of the Fund.

228. Call for increased flows of finance from the MDB and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) systems to be multiplied by three within five years (by 2028), from US\$60 billion to US\$180 billion, including through increased liquidity backed by Special Drawing Rights.

229. Call on bilateral official development assistance (ODA) for climate to be doubled by 2025 from its 2019 level, from US\$30 billion to US\$60 billion, building on the G7 Carbis Bay commitments and the Bridgetown Initiative.

230. Call on Parties with the capacity to do so to communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information on the climate finance they intend to provide and mobilize. They should also be encouraged to report the climate finance provided and mobilized in accordance with Art. 13 of the Paris Agreement.

231. Commit to expanding sources of finance available, including through the exploration of innovative sources of finance and re-assessment of the contributor base for support finance to reflect respective economic capabilities, to maximise the scale and reach of support finance to developing countries.

232. Agree that the mobilization of climate finance should occur from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds.

New Collective Quantified Goal

233. Recognize that the NCQG as the first finance goal under the Paris Agreement provides a critical opportunity to direct concerted action towards aligning financial flows with low emissions and climate resilient development.

234. “PLACEHOLDER: to be informed by, and complementary to, the outcome of deliberations at COP28 on the NCQG, leading to adoption of the NCQG at COP29”.

235. Welcome continued deliberations on an ambitious new collective quantified goal of climate finance by developed countries, from a floor of USD 100 billion per year taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries, by COP29 in 2024, to fulfil the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the objective of the Convention.

236. Recognize that the GST outcome should provide a strong impetus for progress towards a needs-based NCQG, including:

(a) A burden sharing criteria for contributors of climate finance to allow for transparency and accountability;

(b) Full and effective implementation of developed countries of their obligations to provide and mobilize finance as provided for in the Convention and Paris Agreement;

(c) A quantitative value of the goals based on the needs and priorities of developing countries in a bottom-up manner, as opposed to setting a value through a purely political process;

(d) Clear accounting methodologies to track progress on the new goal, leveraging the Enhanced Transparency Framework;

(e) Predictability, adequacy, and access in the delivery of the goal;

(f) Clear direction and policies to address the cost of finance;

(g) Setting clear targets for the contribution of various instruments such as grant, concessional finance, as well as the international public finance component;

(h) The opportunity to send signals to actors in the financial system to embed considerations of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities into their climate finance approaches and to scale up their investments in developing countries;

(i) The opportunity within developed countries to ensure better delivery of future climate finance commitments, through instituting burden sharing within developed countries and reforming national budgetary processes to enable the full delivery of finance commitments;

(j) The opportunity to scale up finance for all climate critical technologies, including energy efficiency technologies, renewables, and carbon capture utilization and storage and direct air capture, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries;

(k) The increasing needs of developing countries in terms of financial support to enhance ambition in implementing nationally determined contributions to the goals of the Paris Agreement;

(l) The necessity to balance the financial support between mitigation and adaptation and the need to achieve Article 9, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement and in that regard the need for developed countries to effectively achieve their commitment to at least double adaptation finance to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025;

(m) The necessity of clear reports and predictability from developed countries, according to Article 9, paragraph 5;

(n) The importance of providing support to developing countries when formulating, implementing, and monitoring their nationally determined contributions, according to Article 4, paragraph 5 of the Paris Agreement and that enhanced ambition in developing countries depends on the provision of financial support from developed countries as provided for in Article 4, paragraph 7, of the Convention as well;

(o) The inadequacy of climate finance provided and mobilized by developed countries to developing countries is a barrier to increase implementation ambition in developing countries;

(p) The importance of providing support to developing countries to assist them in costing their adaptation needs, noting that more needs for adaptation are listed within developing countries' NDCs than for mitigation yet more mitigation needs were costed;

(q) The necessity to enhance transparency and accountability on climate finance, in accordance with Article 13, paragraphs 5 and 7 of the Paris Agreement;

(r) An agreement on criteria for Africa to access a fair share of finance and flows of investments.

237. Call for the NCQG to consider the design and quality of finance provided, taking into account examples such as instruments that provide fiscal space while enabling climate action.

238. Recognize that, in order to set the right global incentives for ensuring that all sources of finance are best used to deliver the ambition of the Paris Agreement, the NCQG must include both an international public mobilisation support target and quantitative targets representing the realignment of finance flows, as well as a total investment target.

239. Urge Parties to set a New Collective Quantified Goal fit for purpose, which will need to differ significantly from previous climate finance goals in order to effectively support the implementation of the Paris Agreement, which in turn will require a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, as well as a broadened contributor base.

Thematic and geographic allocation of finance and financial flows

240. Emphasize that financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation.

241. Urge developed country Parties and others in a position to do so to continue to move towards a balance in adaptation and mitigation finance in accordance with Art. 9 of the Paris Agreement.

242. Call on increased finance in areas that are deemed priority by developing countries, i.e., adaptation and loss & damage, with increasing adaptation finance to US\$200-250billion by 2030 and loss & damage finance to US\$200-400billion.

243. Urge developed countries to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025 to help achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance.

244. Provide additional public, grant-based finance for adaptation to reduce vulnerabilities to the adverse effects of climate change and enhance resilience to minimize future impacts.

245. Address the underfunding of adaptation and loss and damage response; and, increasing accessibility by enhancing and harmonizing access procedures among bilateral, regional, and multilateral sources of climate funding.

246. Call for substantially increasing concessional funding for loss and damage, while also rallying more resources; transform and secure the Fund's role as the primary avenue for new multilateral financing to tackle loss and damage and simultaneously, attract external funding to bolster initiatives aimed at reducing, preventing, and addressing loss and damage, all while assisting in the attainment of global development objectives, particularly those related to sustainability.

247. Incentivize vehicles for long-term adaptation solutions, including via blended finance.

248. Call upon the international financial system to support capital flows toward renewables energy, as part of their current reform.

249. Develop strategies to channel more funds towards ocean-based climate solutions given their potential to create impact and drive ambition towards climate mitigation and adaptation goals.

250. Establish a dedicated programme for supporting developing countries for the development and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, in line with the invitation to enhance NDCs.

251. Call on operating entities of the financial mechanism to better deliver on mandates, including by supporting Carbon Dioxide Removal technologies (CCU/S and DAC) in line with the GCF's governing instrument.

252. Call on support for non-market approaches, including from the operating entities of the financial mechanism to work on joint mitigation and adaptation for the integral and sustainable management of forests, to strengthen financial international cooperation to achieve goals well embedded in equity and climate justice.

Quality of finance, including access

253. Commit to improve and streamline access to finance.

254. Encourage further simplification of access and disbursement procedures in multilateral climate funds, particularly for SIDS.

255. Encourage climate finance providers to be more partner-led, including by investing behind national strategies and exploring higher-order modalities that give more flexibility to recipients and reduce transaction costs.

256. Provide support to help developing countries improve public financial management systems and capacity to access and manage climate finance.

257. Call to climate funds, bilateral contributors, sub-national actors, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to take action to improve access through mechanisms such as reviewing access procedures, harmonising and simplifying processes wherever possible.

258. Call on shifting from loans to grant-based financial flows, improving concessional and lending terms of developing countries, including debt treatment alternatives and innovative financial instruments would play a pivotal role in supporting developing nations.

259. Request to address barriers in access to finance, including its costs, terms and conditions, and simplify access to finance.

Reform of the global financial architecture, including MDBs/IFIs and policy instruments

260. Call for the acceleration to reform the international financial system and Multilateral Development Banks to stimulate and scale up private sector mobilisation to complement public funding and for the elaboration of concrete time-bound actions to achieve this.

261. Call for international financial institutions to consider addressing climate change as one of their reform priorities, to mobilize climate finance from various sources, actively using the breadth of their policy and financial instruments to enhance climate synergies of their projects, and to contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement with greater alignment with its principles and goals.

262. Promote concessional financing to deliver transformative climate adaptation actions by innovative financial mechanisms such as non-debt instruments, and philanthropic funding.

263. Call for MDBs, IFIs, climate funds, and bilateral agencies to work with governments and businesses to incentivize vehicles for long-term adaptation solutions, including via blended finance.

264. Create the necessary enabling environments and leveraging public and private financing to foster greater investments in support to the development and deployment of renewable energy and renewable energy technologies, with particular focus in developing countries.

265. Send signals to actors in the financial system to embed considerations of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities into their climate finance approaches and to scale up their investments in developing countries.

266. Scale down financial flows that run counter to it or those that create barriers to mitigation and adaptation goals, through measures such as phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and putting a price on carbon, as well as putting in place regulations that create the conditions to guide the private and financial sectors and improve transparency and accountability of the private sector by eliminating misleading environmental messaging across markets and address greenwashing.

267. Pursue mainstreaming mitigation and adaptation into every economic and financial decision domestically and globally, as well as into national budgets and the development finance system. Aim to introduce concrete actions ensuring, inter alia, that fiscal and economic levers are designed and applied to green global financial flows; climate considerations are mainstreamed into investment decisions, budgets and development cooperation; and additional finance is mobilized from all sources.

268. Encourage Parties to perform a systematic analysis of domestic fiscal spending in light of supporting urgently needed climate action and the redirection of fossil fuel subsidies to low-carbon energy as soon as possible. Encourage Parties to introduce measures to assess and manage macroeconomic climate risks as well as climate risks for the financial sector.

GCF

269. Take note of the request to the GCF board to increase its support to developing countries in order to guide and enable GCF programming to promote a paradigm shift across both high-impact areas of mitigation potential and countries' adaptation and resilience needs.

MDBs

270. Call on MDB reform to focus on aligning MDB support with borrower priorities, more agile lending operations offering quick access to finance through short processing time, more responsive and targeted advice and expertise to provide technical assistance to facilitate implementation of specific projects and policy advice, and greater accountability towards borrowers and their citizens should be the new mode of operation.

271. Encourage MDB evolution to stretch MDB balance sheets to unlock additional capital without threatening AAA status, to broaden their mandates to cover global public goods, including climate change and to continue to enhance efforts to leverage private finance.

272. Use international public finance to de-risk and mobilise private investment into climate action in developing countries.

273. Call to MDBs to revise their 2025 climate finance forecasts, including for adaptation, by COP29 in line with calls from the G7.

274. Call for IFIs to mobilise more private capital and improve conditions for responsible investment including through the recommendations of the G20 Capital Adequacy Framework review, considering capital increases on a case-by-case basis.

275. Encourage IFIs to set out by the World Bank/IMF annual meetings in 2024 how they have delivered against IFI reform priorities.

276. Further call upon MDBs and DFIs to increase the share of climate finance provided in the form of grants and highly concessional instruments, especially for the design, implementation and monitoring of climate projects that do not generate returns for the private sector to engage.

Debts

277. Agree on innovative approaches to address the debt crisis, including addressing systemic drivers of debt, as well as through debt forgiveness and debt swaps.

278. Call for Climate Resilient Debt Clauses (CRDCs) which allow for an automatic pause in debt repayments and allow countries to respond more effectively post disaster.

279. Recognize the need to avoid creating an unsustainable debt burden for countries when taking climate action, including when responding to climate shocks.

280. Agree on debt relief in particular for SIDS faced with escalating climate impacts and limited access to concessional financing.

281. Call on transforming the international debt architecture so that it ensures all can emerge from this crisis with an equal chance of building back better and differently.

Taxes

282. Call for decisive action on the promotion of inclusive and effective international tax cooperation, including curbing illicit flow of funds through promotion of transparency in the global financial system, automatic exchange of tax (AEI), and double tax avoidance agreement (DTAA).

New instruments

283. Call for green bonds and sustainability-linked loans, developing taxonomies or other guidance to support the development of green finance products, promoting public-private engagement to promote green finance, share experiences, and ensure regulations and policies and targeted effectively.

Phase out subsidies

284. Note that it is important to avoid addressing the impact of Response Measures on national revenues by unilateral measures like carbon border taxes, disinvesting from existing fossil fuels and not financing new operations in the global South without taking corresponding actions to end fossil fuels in the global North.

285. Call on all Parties to consider ways to phase-out and rationalize fossil fuel subsidies to facilitate the urgently needed transition towards a low-emission and climate resilient future. Ideally Parties would also consider using the freed-up public resources (due to the phaseout and rationalization of fossil fuel subsidies) for climate action.

286. Commit to rapidly reform, reduce, and remove fossil fuel subsidies in line with limiting warming to 1.5 degrees, and transitioning to zero emissions.

287. Encourage reorienting support away from price- and trade distorting, and environmentally harmful, agriculture practices into climate-smart and sustainable agriculture practices.

288. Agree to redirect funding from fossil fuel subsidies and investments, carbon pricing instruments, to finance the creation and implementation of national Just Energy Transition funds and plans.

Carbon pricing

289. Encourage pricing of all emissions.

290. Encourage innovative incentive and financing approaches which can increase the global uptake of nature-positive actions, while ensuring environmental and social safeguards, and without compromising gross emission reductions.

Disclosure

291. Recognize that understanding, disclosing, and managing climate-related financial risks should be an integral part of the process without penalizing developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change.

292. Call on Parties and non-Party stakeholders to continue to improve the disclosure of climate-related financial risks, including by encouraging more organizations to disclose, and

further developing the tools and methodologies needed for firms to effectively implement the TCFD's recommendations.

293. Recognize that the impacts of the development of disclosure requirements on developing countries has already proven to be detrimental. According to a joint study issued by Imperial College Business School and SOAS commissioned by UN Environment, climate risks are increasing the cost of capital for developing countries; for every ten dollars countries pay in interest payments, an additional dollar is due to climate vulnerability.

Reporting and definition of climate finance

294. Welcome the work of the Standing Committee on Finance on climate finance definitions.

295. Note that it is crucial to have an agreed definition on climate finance and Article 2.1.c in order to prevent greenwashing, ensuring additionality (what is meant by the terms – 'new and additional') and avoidance of double counting and rebranding of existing funding for development, humanitarian support and ODAs as climate finance and enhance clarity and trust.

296. Develop tools and methodologies, including a common set of metrics, to better appraise and track climate finance for adaptation action, including in the form of grants and other concessional instruments.

297. Stress the necessity to assess and clarify the accounting matrix and practices by developed countries, which can reflect the actual level of support provided by developed countries.

298. Call on all Parties to use their first Biennial Transparency Reports in 2024 to enhance the transparency of climate finance provided, mobilised, received, and the associated climate action that it supports.

299. Request developed country Parties and encourage other Parties to submit ambitious biennial communications of indicative quantitative and qualitative information, as applicable, including, as available, on projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties in 2024.

300. Develop reporting guidelines under the Paris Agreement, and encourage non-state actors to move towards common standards and enhance transparency, strengthen work on methodologies to assess the consistency of financial portfolios with pathways towards low emission and climate resilient development, and strengthen efforts to avoid greenwashing.

301. Urge developed country Parties to provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines.

302. Promote international sustainable finance standards, encourage guidance and methods for measuring climate impacts and risks and the setting of requirements for sustainability reporting, including climate related disclosures.

Follow-up

303. Welcome the Sharm El-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1c, of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement in 2023.

304. Stress that action taken to achieve the objectives of Article 9 and Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement are neither interchangeable nor mutually exclusive.

305. Reiterate that work to agree the scope and implementation of Article 2.1c must be underpinned by continued and scaled up finance provisions made by developed countries under Article 9.

306. Stress that the operationalisation of Article 2.1c must be based on collective understanding and definition of what it entails and how it is supporting the implementation of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.

307. Note that the interpretation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement by the developed countries is violative of equity. Implementation of Article 2.1(c) is being used in denying

essential fossil fuel development for developing countries, even though these have serious consequences for their economies and their population.

308. Establish an agenda item on aligning financial flows with low emissions and climate resilient development, with a mandate to begin developing a work programme at COP 28 with a view to providing information on efforts related to the achievement of Article 2.1(c), presenting clear plans to further accelerate implementation, and exchanging views on experiences and best practices.

309. Request the Standing Committee on Finance to continue work on the implementation of Article 2.1c, including a focus on tracking progress.

(b) Technology development and transfer

310. Almost all Parties provided their views on the elements they would like to see included for technology development and transfer.

311. A few of the non-Party stakeholders' submissions highlighted carbon-capture storage networks allows multiple CO₂ sources to share transport and storage infrastructure to reduce costs, risks and the need for a massive scale-up and transfer of technologies in developing countries, with the recognition that there has been no real transfer of such technologies to developing countries and developed countries have failed to acknowledge the barriers to access such technologies by developing countries.

(ii) Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers

Possible elements

312. Recognize that achieving systemic transformations in pursuit of the 1.5 °C degree goal requires rapid deployment and adoption of cleaner technologies and accelerated innovation and development of new technologies, with growing access to these supported by appropriate enabling frameworks and international cooperation.

313. Recognize that Parties have made significant efforts to scale up technology development and transfer since the adoption of the Paris Agreement including through significantly increasing the provision of support for technology development and transfer.

314. Recognize good practices on technology development and transfer, including:

(a) Strengthening domestic and local enabling environments to foster trade and investment in technology development and transfer;

(b) Recognize that effective action on technology development and transfer requires;

(c) Support through international cooperation and by international financial mechanisms and development assistance;

(d) Public policy that aligns private sector investment with climate objectives and creates an enabling environment, including through regulations, targeted tax incentives and public investment;

(e) Promoting innovation to foster local capacities and entrepreneurship and reducing costs of technologies, including renewables.

315. Welcome the progress in the development and adoption of global climate technology, including the increased available options, declined costs of some low-emission technologies, significantly increased renewable energy capacity and generation, and increased global patent application, yet also note that almost half of mitigation technologies needed to achieve net zero emission by 2050 in the energy sector are currently at a demonstration or prototype stage.

316. Recognize that adoption has been unequal across geographies with developing countries having historically less access to opportunities to deploy technologies and possess less capability to develop new technologies.

317. Recognize that technology transfer is part of a broader policy package for international cooperation (along with climate finance and adaptation support) under which developed countries are committed to provide support to assist developing countries undertake climate actions.

318. Recognize that the Technology Mechanism (TM), comprising the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Center & Network (CTCN), is the principal vehicle through which Parties cooperate on technology development and transfer and that progress includes strengthened collaboration between the TM and the Financial Mechanism support for development of NDCs and TNAs.

319. Note with serious concerns that the TM lacks sufficient, sustainable and predictable funding to fulfil its mandate and that technology transfer needs identified in the technology needs assessments (TNAs) and the technology action plans (TAP) remain unmet and unfunded thus jeopardizing achievement of the Paris agreement goals and objectives.

320. Recognize the economic, financial and technical barriers that exist in developing countries and which need to be addressed to be able to enhance action and international cooperation on climate change, including related to the effect of Intellectual Property Rights, weak access to finance and high capital costs, low investment in R&D and low support for promotion of in-country technology development processes, insufficient capacity of innovation, and inadequate application and deployment of advanced climate technology.

321. Recognize the gaps in international collaborative activities relating to technology development and transfer, including focus on enabling frameworks and knowledge sharing rather than collaborative R&D, limited focus on adaptation.

322. Emphasize a lack of global assessment on progress of technology development and transfer, including on deficiency of effective, systematic, comprehensive data and information, on the needs, progress, capacity and challenges of developing countries, etc.

(iii) *Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress*

Possible elements

323. Emphasize the critical enabling role of technology development and transfer in mitigation and adaptation actions towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

324. Accelerate the development, transfer and deployment of technologies to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce GHG emissions, in accordance with Article 11 of the Paris Agreement.

325. Enhance people-centred, human rights-based, and gender-responsive international cooperation focusing on promoting innovation, collaborative research and development, technical assistance, capacity building, knowledge sharing, artificial intelligence, and supporting developing countries abilities to strengthen their national enabling environment to incentives trade and investment.

326. Encourage enhanced international cooperation on public-private partnerships and strategies such as sectoral roadmaps, converting TNAs and TAPs into bankable projects, and leapfrogging to digital infrastructure to maximize the benefits of technology and innovation in achieving climate objectives.

327. Emphasize the critical importance of technology cooperation for developing emerging technologies and deploying available technologies on a large scale, and request Parties to enable, accelerate and enhance international cooperation on climate-friendly technologies, and to ensure non-exclusive and non-discriminatory environment for such cooperation.

328. Address challenges and barriers and facilitate greater diffusion and deployment of clean technologies taking into account national circumstances and needs within and outside the TM through:

(a) Strengthened and adequately resourced TM, especially the CTCN, with enhanced linkages with the Financial Mechanism to carry out the Joint Work Programme for

2023-2027, with a special emphasis on innovation and strengthened collaboration with the private sector and regional development banks;

(b) Facilitate access to and stimulate the uptake of existing clean technologies that are readily available and proven;

(c) Enhanced access to finance and financial support, including from multilateral funds;

(d) Increasing support for innovation, creation of enabling environments, training, research and development;

(e) Deploying key technologies at scale and making them more affordable and accessible;

(f) Supporting endogenous technologies, including through additional regional technology centres;

(g) Creating global forums where developed countries share their technological prowess with developing countries;

(h) Eliminating tariffs and other impediments to green technology transfer and standardizing protocols and systems.

329. Decide to establish a Technology Implementation Programme, supported by the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism, to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing country Parties in their TNAs, TAPs, NAPs and NDCs.

330. Urge developed countries to fulfil their technology transfer obligations and to effectively enhance climate technology development and transfer.

331. Stress the importance of periodic review of progress on technology development and transfer and decide to develop a comprehensive, transparent and comparable assessment approach and a systematic indicator matrix to assess global progress and gaps, including to identify needs of developing countries.

332. Encourage international organizations and institutions including the International Energy Agency, the International Renewable Energy Agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Trade Organization, etc. to promote global climate technology development, transfer and cooperation.

333. A few of the non-Party stakeholder submissions call on Parties to recognize the necessity for research and technological innovation to be tailored to local conditions and farmers and the necessity for research and technological innovation to be tailored to local conditions. Some non-Party stakeholders also emphasized the need to provide signals for reducing technology costs and enabling technology transfer by agreeing to strengthen international cooperation for technology development and transfer; accelerate research, innovation and knowledge sharing; and prioritize support to address vulnerable countries' tailored needs.

(c) Capacity-building

334. Almost all Parties submitted their views on capacity-building. Almost all Parties underline that country and needs-driven capacity-building is foundational to undertaking sustained climate action and that it requires adequate financial, technical and technological support from international cooperation to ensure capacities are enhanced and retained over time at all levels.

335. Many Parties elaborate on the kind of capacity-building needed including as it relates to individual capacity applying skills and knowledge, institutional capacity for governance and coordination, technical capacity to carry out assessment, costing, modelling and evaluation, including sectoral expertise, capacity to align financial flows with the goals of the Paris Agreement, relational capacity to build partnerships and invest time in processes; and strategic capacity for systemic policy design and implementation.

336. Several non-Party stakeholders highlighted various capacity building initiatives such as those that offers coaching and investment facilitation for climate and clean energy projects in developing countries, called upon developed countries to advance partnerships to build the capacity, MRV, technology and transparency systems needed in developing country Parties. They further highlighted the importance of capacity building support to enable the operationalization of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and urged the provision of capacity building support to developing country Parties to align financial flows with Paris Agreement goals. Some non-Party stakeholders also emphasized an outcome that supports long-term capacity building, addressing local needs and providing support to conduct capacity gaps and needs assessments.

(i) *Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers*

Possible elements

337. Recognize that Parties have made progress in scaling up capacity-building support at the individual, institutional and systemic level since the adoption of the Paris Agreement , including through the Paris Committee on Capacity building (PCCB), the NDC Partnership, the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency, South–South cooperation, and endogenous resources of developing countries.

338. Recognize good practices of capacity-building, including multilevel, multi-stakeholder engagement; beneficiary country ownership of building and maintaining capacity; sharing of good practices, experience and lessons learned; resulting in direct finance benefits.

339. Stress that developing countries are faced with multiple challenges in economic development and livelihood improvement, which leads to insufficient capacities of developing countries and the mounting pressure to coordinate development and mitigation action in pursuit of low GHG, climate-resilient development.

340. Recognize that many developing country Parties, in particular LDCs and SIDS, have urgent needs for enhancing capacity at the national, subnational and local levels to implement the Paris Agreement, including for planning, implementing monitoring and evaluating their climate policies and measures.

341. Recognize that there are persistent gaps in capacity-building related to:

(a) Accessing capacity building and in the modalities for delivery that limit the capacity for skills to be enhanced and knowledge retained over time;

(b) Insufficient financial resources provided for capacity-building, most of which is fragmented, project-based, knowledge-sharing-focused and consequently inefficient.

(ii) *Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress*

Possible elements

342. Call for urgent and scaled-up financial and technical support through international cooperation to ensure human, technical, institutional, educational and systemic capacities are built, enhanced and retained over time at all levels and across all sectors to deliver on low GHG, climate resilient development including as it relates to policy-coherence, building and bolstering climate-centric institutions, comprehensive educational initiatives, sustained knowledge transfer and continued capacity enhancement.

343. Call for country-led capacity-building to be guided by lessons learned, existing knowledge and shared experiences, including from South-South, triangular and private sector cooperation, highlighting it should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.

344. Call for continued sharing of best practices and lessons learned on capacity building.

345. Call on developing country Parties to indicate capacity building needs in their BTRs.

346. Urge developed country Parties to provide adequate, sustained, systematic capacity building support to assist developing country Parties in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.

347. Request to establish a capacity-building fund, and to establish institutional links with existing financial funds such as the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund, etc., to further enhance the capacity building for developing countries.

4. Efforts related to loss and damage

348. Almost all Parties submitted their views on efforts related to loss and damage with some Parties submitting it as part of the adaptation section and a few Parties after the section on response measures. According to many, loss and damage needs to be addressed as a continuum with some calling for the GST to recommend crosscutting solutions to enhance synergies between adaptation, disaster risk management and other approaches to avert, minimize and address loss and damage. Others noted that the level of loss and damage and therefore the costs incurred will depend, among others, on the level of ambition of global mitigation actions and the level of investment in adaptation at the local level.

(ii) *Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers*

Possible elements

Losses and damages incurred and already projected

349. Recognize that countries and communities in every region of the world are already experiencing loss and damage and that risks of loss and damage will increase with increasing global warming and that risks are being compounded and cascading with projections of increased warming, for example limiting warming to 2 °C is too high to save the Himalayan Cryosphere and one-third of glacier volume in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan region is projected to be lost by the end of the century in a 1.5°C warmer world; losses having economic impacts, for example responding to current climate change vulnerabilities costs African countries 3-5 percent of GDP annually and, in some cases, more than 15 percent.

350. Acknowledge that risks are growing and that climate-induced GDP reductions will occur even with a Paris Agreement-aligned to 1.5°C future and that losses and damages arising from the adverse effects of climate change are increasing in scale, frequency, and intensity; and are more and more adversely affecting the ability of developing countries in all regions to achieve the right to development, eradicate poverty, to survive, and provide better lives for their peoples.

351. Recognize the increased importance and urgency in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and that limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees will substantially reduce loss and damage due to adverse impacts of climate change.

352. Note that projected impacts will exceed hard limits to adaptation and that some impacts will be irreversible as temperatures increase beyond 1.5°C.

353. Note the importance of enhancing efforts to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in the light of continued global warming and its significant impacts on developing countries.

Progress under the Paris Agreement, including through the WIM and the Santiago Network

354. Recognize that the Paris Agreement acknowledges through Article 8, that loss and damage is a serious and irreversible consequence of climate change, and that it is a global challenge that requires a global response and cooperation. Developed countries are obligated to provide financial assistance to developing countries to help them cope with the impacts of climate change in accordance with the principle of CBDR-RC. This assistance can be used to build inclusive climate-resilient infrastructure, provide disaster relief, and support adaptation programs.

355. Recognize that since the Paris Agreement was adopted, there have been significant advancements in international cooperation to avert, minimize, and address loss and damage in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and its Executive Committee and its expert groups, which include a broad range of organizations, networks,

and experts, which have served as useful venues for enhancing knowledge, strengthening coordination, and enhancing action in addition to producing helpful technical products.

356. Acknowledge the progress made including under the WIM Executive Committee and its expert groups, the establishment of the Santiago Network, the growing cooperative efforts on enhancing understanding, action and support with respect to loss and damage, and the establishment of new funding arrangements, including a fund.

357. Recognize progress in averting, minimising, and addressing loss and damage at local, national and international levels, including knowledge products produced by the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, the establishment of the Santiago Network and the space provided by the Glasgow Dialogue to discuss this important issue.

358. Acknowledge that the WIM has made a valuable contribution to increasing understanding of current experiences of and approaches to loss and damage, particularly for non-economic and slow onset loss and damage and enhancing knowledge, capacities, dialogues, coordination, support and technical assistance for developing countries in addressing loss and damages.

Progress at international and national level

359. Recognize that in addition to the UNFCCC, various international organizations, such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the World Bank, are sharing knowledge on loss and damage, promoting cooperation among relevant organizations and strengthening coherence and synergy.

360. Commend the various efforts to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the United Nations Secretary-General's Early Warnings for All, the Belt and Road Ministerial Forum for International Cooperation in Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Management, etc..

361. Recognize that Early Warning Systems (EWS)/Early Warning Early Action plays a significant role in responding towards loss and damage and that taking anticipatory action through EWS allows vulnerable communities to minimise their exposure to hazards and thus mitigate potential disasters.

362. Recognize that the Paris Agreement has catalyzed action on areas outlined in Article 8.4 of the Paris Agreement, for example in the areas of early warning systems, emergency preparedness, risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling, and other insurance solutions, noting that these initiatives represent significant advancements, but gaps remain, particularly reaching the most vulnerable communities. Additional efforts to close these gaps could significantly help households, communities, and countries manage the adverse impacts of climate change.

363. Recognize national efforts to respond to loss and damage, such as establishing national loss and damage frameworks, integrated disaster risk management and adaptation plans, and mechanisms to channel funding to the local level to support activities relevant to averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage.

Funding and support

364. Welcome the establishment of new funding arrangements, including a fund for assisting developing country Parties in responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including with a focus on addressing loss and damage, and appreciates the work of the Transitional Committee;

365. Recognize that over 50 per cent of debt increase in vulnerable countries is now related to funding disaster recoveries.

366. Recognize progress to avoid unsustainable debt burdens, through mechanisms such as climate resilient debt clauses. This includes the World Bank announcement of the inclusion

of climate resilient debt clauses in their loan agreements, which will help support countries that are impacted by climate shocks as they try to rebuild.

Gaps

367. Note that, despite current actions to deliver responses to loss and damage through a range of mechanisms, including social protection and financial measures, and to draw on multiple sources of finance including development, climate and humanitarian assistance and private finance, there are gaps in the response that will need to be addressed, including the response to certain losses such as non-economic loss and damage.

368. Recognize that risk management approaches are currently not sufficiently comprehensive and not deployed broadly enough to make countries and communities more resilient to the adverse effects of climate change and to reduce the scale of both economic and non-economic losses and damages.

369. Acknowledge the need for more transformative action when limits to manage climate related risks are reached, such as support for alternative livelihoods and economic systems.

370. Note with concerns that significant gaps exist for developing countries to address loss and damage in terms of funding, technology and capacity-building, and highlights the urgency to enhance the capacities and capabilities of developing countries in responding to loss and damage.

371. Note that there are no comprehensive approaches for addressing and responding to economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, especially in the context of ongoing and ex post (including rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction) action. Currently, it is developing countries taking the responsibility to face the burden of cost and consequences of addressing loss and damage.

372. Recognize that there are financial, technical and institutional gaps that obstruct the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage. These gaps are related to approaches required to deal with long-term disaster recovery, for responding to slow-onset processes, as well as modalities to address noneconomic losses.

373. Recognize that current financial, governance and institutional arrangements to address loss and damage are insufficient.

(iii) Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress

Enhancing action, including through cooperation

374. Recognize that urgent mitigation and adaptation action are crucial to avoiding and minimizing loss and damage, to the extent possible. Greater understanding is needed of how to avoid and respond to tipping points and more knowledge, understanding, support, policy and action are needed to comprehensively manage risks and avert, minimize and address loss and damage.

375. Recognize the need for further strengthened action and support for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage including the need to enhance anticipatory action and work on the climate-humanitarian-development nexus.

376. Design and deliver a response that is fit-for-purpose, and responsive to the needs of particularly vulnerable countries, particularly SIDS and LDCs

377. Call on Parties to make efforts to pursue synergies with disaster risk reduction, humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery assistance in order to advance averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage.

378. Call on world leaders, global institutions, private business and civil society to work together to deliver on the calls to scale up action and support to avert, minimize and address loss and damage.

379. Emphasize the need to coordinate more across responses to loss and damage, including collaboration amongst climate, development and humanitarian actors and

coherence across the loss and damage architecture to enhance effectiveness and reduce duplication.

380. Commit to enhance areas of cooperation, including those outlined in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement such as early warning systems, emergency preparedness, risk insurance and resilience building.

381. Encourage the establishment of climate risk approaches in increased action across the continuum of climate action encompassing mitigation and adaptation to best avert, minimize and address loss and damage and increase responses to loss and damage.

382. Enhance deployment of comprehensive risk management approaches, this includes, notably, disaster risk reduction (incl. amongst other early warning), mainstreaming risk management and climate resilience, adaptation, anticipatory action as well as broader risk-informed resilient sustainable development that reduces exposure and vulnerabilities (through poverty eradication, education, biodiversity protection, etc). As much as loss and damage can't be averted, different approaches to address both economic and non-economic loss and damage need also to be intensified, including through post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction and by building back better. Efforts need to not only increase in volume but also their quality should be improved. In this regards, solid environmental and social risk management, gender-responsiveness as well as conflict sensitivity are required. It is key that the most vulnerable groups, including in conflict-affected areas, are being reached and empowered.

383. Recognize the need to enhance data availability and accessibility to effectively avert, minimise and address loss and damage, noting that increasing the provision of data on projected loss and damage can also help inform policy decisions and early action.

384. Encourage Parties to integrate climate risk management into cohesive national plans.

385. Request relevant bodies or institutions to develop climate change risk and vulnerability assessment from the sub-national to national level and regional level to inform the subsequent GST on global impacts and needs of Loss and Damage with costed actions for implementation.

Support, fund and funding arrangements

386. Make efforts to enhance coordination and complementarity and improve access to the currently available support and explore, where appropriate, the mobilization of private finance through financial instruments such as insurance.

387. Recognize that vastly scaling up action and support, in particular finance for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage in vulnerable developing countries in light of equity and the best available science from all sources is a must.

388. Acknowledge the wider landscape of support to loss and damage. This is key to efficient delivery.

389. Urge developed countries to provide funds for the operationalization of the SNLD in accordance with decision 1/CMA.3 and technical as well as capacity building support to developing countries to help them build the skills and knowledge they need to manage the impacts of climate change. This support can include training on it.

390. Call for increased scaled up resources delivered through the Loss and Damage Fund to be operationalised at COP 28 in line with the principles and provisions of the Convention and Paris Agreement for the preparation and implementation of short, medium, and long-term plans related to identification and implementation of approaches address all types of loss and damage (including risk reduction, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction)

391. 'PLACEHOLDER: to be informed by, and complementary to, the outcome of negotiations on the fund and funding arrangements.'

392. Recognize that besides contributions by different types of contributors, the new loss and damage fund should be enabled to receive contributions from innovative sources, such as a "fossil fuel extraction tax", a global CO₂ tax or an "international shipping levy" which

constitute effective ways to leverage additional resources to avert, minimize and address loss and damage from emission intensive sectors based on the polluter-pays principle.

393. Agree that innovative financial mechanisms, including contributions from the private sector and philanthropies, can support greater climate action to address loss and damage.

394. Call on MBDs, IFIs and others to increase financing for loss and damage, including to identify relevant investments from existing funding streams and pipelines, and to support vulnerable countries on the front line of climate change.

395. Recognize the need to avoid creating an unsustainable debt burden for countries responding to loss and damage.

396. Urge developed country Parties to provide finance, technology transfer and capacity building support for developing country Parties to close the gaps in addressing loss and damages towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.

397. Urge developed country Parties to provide new, additional, adequate, predictable and grant-based financial resources to the new funding arrangements, including the fund for responding to loss and damage, and all developing countries have access to the fund, with special consideration given to, inter alia, SIDS and LDCs, as appropriate.

398. Stresses that the new funding arrangements, including the fund for responding to loss and damage, cover ongoing and ex-post actions that developing countries take to address impacts of slow onset and extreme events, including rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction, etc., with simplified and effective operating modalities, accommodating different national circumstances without one-size-fits-all approach, inter alia, by exploring a dedicated window for emergency response funding with efficient access for developing countries.

399. Strengthen as appropriate existing mechanisms that endeavour to increase coordination, coherence and synergies between funding arrangements. In addition, at the global level, key agencies involved in averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage could meet periodically at the margins of COP meetings to coordinate and harness synergies. Most importantly, coordination, coherence and collaboration must happen at the country and local levels according to diverse contexts (no one size fits all) and with national and local ownership. At those levels, the new loss and damage fund, other funding arrangements and the Santiago Network can support coordination mechanisms.

400. Acknowledge the need to strengthen, scale up, and improve coordination of the broader mosaic of loss and damage funding arrangements, including a fund, and expanding sources of funding stemming from a broad contributor base beyond the traditional donors, drawing upon a variety of sources including private and innovative sources, and aligning financial flows to invest in climate-resilient development.

401. Resolve to enhance delivery of more and better pre-arranged finance for financial protection of vulnerable people and countries to increase capacity to avert, minimize and address loss and damage resulting from the adverse effects of climate change, including enhanced responses.

402. Encourage existing actors and funding arrangements to enhance support for actions working to avert, minimize and address loss and damage and to find complementarity, in line with and not prejudicing recommendations to be made by the Transitional Committee.

403. Note that the loss and damage fund is a compensation in line with and in addition to the existing call for climate finance. Establishing the eligibility criterion for availing the fund must acknowledge historical responsibility by over-emitting countries and provide fair compensation to countries still within their fair shares. Since Loss and Damage considers climate change effects over time, it can accommodate changes in emissions trajectories over time for future eligibility.

404. Establish an easy-to-use funding arrangement that may be accessed quickly and appropriately, technology transfer, as well as equitable capacity building and enhanced technical assistance based on national needs regarding Loss and Damage.

405. Several non-Party stakeholders called for the loss and damage fund at COP 28 to be the principal multilateral structure to catalyze and channel funds to address loss and damage and be based on the principles of CBDR-RC and equity, whilst calling for the adoption of comprehensive management approaches to minimize risks and explore options for transferring risk, such as through climate risk pools and insurance programs.

406. Several non-Party stakeholders highlighted that current funding is insufficient to respond to loss and damage and there needs to be a coordinated and coherent response and encouraged support for addressing non-economic loss and damage such as loss of culture and heritage, with an assurance to compensate the most vulnerable countries affected, and the need for community and country specific research and solutions.

Santiago Network and WIM

407. Recognize that the Santiago Network should be fully operationalized as soon as possible and move to implementing its functions, including assisting in identifying, prioritizing, and communicating needs and priorities noting that it will play a complementary role to the loss and damage fund and funding arrangements, to catalyse the technical assistance needed for effectively addressing loss and damage.

408. Operationalize the Santiago Network, including by selecting a host organization, and the loss and damage fund. Ensure that the different elements of the institutional architecture work in complementarity, harnessing synergies and opportunities to work together, amongst them and with other funding arrangements.

409. Urge Parties to increase access to technical assistance to avert, minimize, and address loss and damage especially for developing countries and their communities that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change as catalysed through the Santiago Network.

Technology development and transfer and capacity building

410. Urge enhanced technology transfer and cooperation from developed countries to developing countries, including on disaster early warning, forecasts and intelligent observation, to improve the capabilities of developing countries in fast tracking, accurate locating and multi-dimensional observation of meteorological disasters with enhanced precision; on comprehensive assessment of post-disaster losses and risks of secondary disasters, and establishment of information platforms for emergency supplies and disaster relief supplies reserves; on satellite remote sensing, as well as disaster risk assessment of unportable cultural relics in extreme weather events, and post-disaster repair and restoration of cultural relics, etc. to minimize the non-economic losses.

411. Urge developed countries to provide enhanced capacity building support responding to the needs of developing countries in addressing loss and damages, including addressing the challenges of inadequate density of small- and medium-scale observation stations for extreme climate disasters, insufficient connection between disaster early warning and corresponding actions, and ineffectiveness of timely transmission of early warning information; strengthening information sharing mechanisms on earth observation systems and disaster/relief information systems, promoting cooperation in information and data research on sea level rise, ocean acidification and other slow-onset climatic events, and improving the capacity of developing countries to conduct comprehensive multi-hazard risk assessment; as well as enhancing the planning capacities of coastal resilient cities, improving infrastructure and standards of flood and disaster resistance, and strengthening the constructions of seawalls and coastal wetlands, etc..

Additional considerations

412. Recognize the importance of the stability, security, certainty, and predictability of maritime entitlements that are vulnerable to sea-level rise caused by climate change and adopt practices that promote such stability, security, certainty, and predictability, including by

committing not to challenge lawfully established baselines and maritime zone limits that are not subsequently updated despite sea-level rise caused by climate change.

Monitoring and reporting

413. Call for the development of indicators to measure loss and damage in order to support LDCs in accessing loss and damage financing.

414. Call for the WIM alongside other bodies to develop indicators for measuring and understanding loss and damage, including from extreme weather and slow onset events, and considering both economic and non-economic losses.

Future

415. Call on subsequent GST to take stock of regional and global adverse impacts of loss and damage and assess the needs required to address it. The subsequent GST should also assess effectiveness and adequacy of loss and damage institutions (including the Loss & Damage Fund (including assessment of new, additional, predictable and adequate financial resources), the new institutional arrangements, Santiago Network and the Executive Committee of Warsaw International Mechanism).

416. Some non-Party stakeholders called for a recognition of extreme weather events leading to loss of prospects for children.

417. Some non-Party stakeholders emphasized the need for an inclusive crisis management plan that consider the needs and experiences of the LGBTQ+ community in the aftermath of climate disasters.

418. Several non-Party stakeholders called for the meaningful participation of affected communities, particularly marginalized groups and Indigenous Peoples in the design and implementation of a loss and damage fund, and the identification of challenges and barriers to scaling up efforts in developing countries, with developed countries taking the lead on providing climate finance, as well as collaboration and coordination between Parties to coordinate with humanitarian systems to avoid duplication when designing and implementing policies.

419. Some non-Party stakeholders called on the UN Climate Change High-Level Champions to play a leading role in providing evidence and case studies where collaboration between Parties and NPS can help address the actual climate losses and damages experienced by communities and urged the inclusion of just transitions in NDCs.

420. Several non-Party stakeholders highlighted the impacts of climate change on industries and business, including disrupted supply chains and damaged infrastructure, and noted with concern the already observed and projected losses and damages to humans and natural systems and the closing window of opportunity.

421. A few of the non-Party stakeholder submissions stated that GST outcomes should acknowledge the inadequacies in responding to loss and damage by recognizing that both “soft and hard limits” to adaptation result in losses and damages.

5. Efforts related to response measures

422. Almost all Parties submitted their views on efforts related to response measures. One Party does not see the need for a standalone section on the impact of response measures.

423. While many Parties acknowledge that mitigation is necessary, they also emphasize that sustainable economic development is essential for developing country Parties to deal with climate change and that policies and measures taken by developed countries to combat climate change at global, national and regional levels shall not undermine the development, nor constitute a means of transferring the burden of climate change mitigation to developing country Parties).

(i) Backward looking: collective progress, gaps, challenges and barriers

424. Parties submitted their views on collective progress regarding the intended (mitigation benefits and co-benefits including health benefits, creation of decent work and quality jobs,

and energy security) and unintended effects of response measures and adverse impacts of climate action (negative impacts on socio-economic development, including loss of income, trade disruption, reduced competitiveness) as well as in the work of the Forum on the Implementation of Response Measures (the Forum) and the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI).

425. Many Parties emphasized the significance of economic diversification and a just transition to low-carbon economies as crucial strategies to address the adverse effects of response measures. Opportunities for such diversification include green industrialization, the greening of supply chains and diversifying to related and unrelated products.

426. A few Parties pointed out that countries emphasizing forestry, biodiversity-based economies, or those facing land use-related decarbonization challenges often feel side-lined in the global discussion of the impact produced by the implementation of response measures.

427. Many Parties noted that the response measures agenda has advanced since the adoption of the Paris Agreement; however, they stress that it has failed to keep up with the high ambitions and emerging political pressure for an accelerated low-carbon system transformation.

428. In this regard, Parties recognize that the Forum and the KCI have helped Parties build capacity to implement domestic just transition policies, diversify their economies, and understand the available tools and methodologies for assessing and analysing the impacts of the implementation of response measures. At the same time, many point out that the Forum has not been proactive in facilitating the type of dialogue and other technical work needed for mitigating the negative impacts of response measures on developing countries and that financial support is missing to support the work of the Forum and the KCI.

Possible elements

429. Recognize overall positive effects of mitigation efforts on economies and society and acknowledge co-benefits and acknowledge that these benefits may not be equally distributed and noting that the lack of implementing response measures and the building of new unabated fossil fuel infrastructure not only contributes to global GHG emissions, but also risks stranded assets and economic and job losses.

430. Recognize that developing countries have a right to sustainably develop, expand their economies, and improve their populations' quality of life and that policies and measures taken by developed countries to combat climate change at global, national and regional levels shall not undermine their development.

(ii) Forward looking: opportunities and messages for further progress

431. Parties provided their views on how to further progress on addressing response measures, including through strengthening support and capacity building as well as enhanced assessment and analysis, including through the Forum and the KCI; through refining response measures and further developing economic diversification strategies and just transition plans and finally through better monitoring and sharing of experiences and lessons learned.

Possible elements

General

432. Stress the continued need for developing country Parties to develop.

433. Emphasize the importance of minimizing the negative and maximizing the positive impacts of implementation of mitigation policies and action and stress the co-benefits of implementing response measures, such as health benefits resulting from reduced air pollution, the creation of decent work and quality jobs and energy security.

434. Emphasize that combating climate change requires collaborative efforts and that response measures, taken without consideration of common but differentiated responsibilities principle and multilateral trade rules, may constitute a trade barrier leading to significant economic disruptions in developing countries.

435. Call on using collective and participatory decision-making processes to create informed approaches can help countries maximise the positive benefits to economies, livelihoods, health and equity, associated with the implementation of response measures and address negative impacts.

436. Integrate concerns like gender equality, climate justice, human rights, and insights from the local communities and indigenous people into the discourse and actions.

Economic diversification and just transition

437. Call for a just transition to ensure that the necessary transitions to low emission societies do not increase social or geographical inequalities and encourage all Parties to enhance their efforts to ensure a just transition and acknowledge the need for support to just transition pathways for developing countries.

438. Recognize economic diversification as a key strategy to address the impacts of response measures and just transition as an enabler for enhanced ambition and call on Parties to adopt and implement measures for economic diversification and develop and implement domestic policies for just transition to socio-economic systems aligned with net-zero target.

439. Welcome the work programme on just transition and the annual high-level Ministerial round table on just transition and call for the consideration of the unique circumstances of SIDS and African Countries.

440. Decide to establish a long-term mechanism under the UNFCCC to ensure just transitions of developing country Parties towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement in the context of sustainable development and eradication of poverty.

Advancing the work on response measures, including under the Forum and KCI

441. Call on work on response measures to be broadened to consider approaches that not only focus on the costs of action, but recognize the opportunities and co-benefits associated with low GHG emissions development, approaches that are tailored to different communities and contexts such as circular carbon economy; green industrialization; the greening of supply chains; training people in sector-specific skills; and the contribution of sectors such as tourism, aviation and shipping as well as to enhance systematic and comprehensive assessment, analysis, addressing, and reporting of all the environmental, social, and economic impacts arising from the implementation of mitigation policies, programs and actions according to the specific needs and concerns of Parties.

442. Strengthen the Forum and KCI, including through:

(a) Adapting the modalities of the Forum to help Parties understand, assess, and address the impacts of response measures, including not confining it to SB sessions and structuring it in a proactive and interactive manner;

(b) Improving its function on cooperation with other bodies within and outside the UNFCCC;

(c) Reviewing the forum to incorporate a greater science-based approach, including through installing the IPCC as a member of the KCI;

(d) Enhancing its work plan to:

(i) Set up a system or platform under the KCI for reporting and addressing negative impacts, and the provision of support to countries affected by it;

(ii) Identify specific actions aiming to avoid and/or minimize the negative socioeconomic impacts of response measures on developing countries, including through conceptual discussions on these impacts, having in mind the objective of developing a roadmap with plans and tools to help to understand, access and address them;

(iii) Consider aspirational mitigation policies, such as the phase out of unabated fossil fuels to build confidence in Parties to adopt similar 1.5 C aligned policies, including methodologies and models for assessing and analyzing the adverse impacts of response measures, sectoral benchmarks and case studies;

- (iv) Identify and assess the negative impacts of the climate-related unilateral measures, with a view to eliminating such unilateral measures and pursue systematic solutions;
- (v) Capacity-building programmes and enhancing awareness;
- (vi) Monitoring and reporting;
- (vii) Providing adequate means to fulfil their mandate and equipping them with the required operating systems and enabling processes/tools to translate exchanged information, experiences, case studies and best practices into tangible products with and measurable targets.

Enhancing support to address response measures

443. Enhance finance, capacity building and technological transfer, including from MDBs to address adverse effects of response measures and support just and equitable transition, in accordance with nationally defined development priorities, including cooperation and capacity building and joint training programmes in emerging green sectors and sharing of knowledge and best practices to adopt green technologies.

444. Establish a global interactive platform and levy system which responds to the outcomes from the reporting dialogues on negative impacts of response measures in support of developing countries.

Reporting

445. Encourage enhanced reporting on response measures through existing instruments to better evaluate their impacts and how efforts related to response measures progress.

D. Enhancing international cooperation for climate action

446. Almost all Parties submitted their views on efforts the enhancement of international cooperation for climate action, recognizing the importance of international cooperation for implementing the Paris Agreement. In their views, Parties elaborated on the importance of such cooperation in the context of enabling and strengthening of climate action by both Parties and non-Party stakeholders, aimed at global low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

447. Many Parties emphasized that international cooperation should help in identifying and addressing challenges, barriers and gaps relating to climate action as well as the related opportunities and good practices. Many Parties noted that international cooperation is a key element to have considering that a key outcome of the GST is to enhance international cooperation on climate change, also noting that among the key considerations is that unilateral coercive measures should not be used for climate action and the need for inclusive and equitable international cooperation and coherence between climate action and other international policy regimes that are relevant to the full and effective achievement of the objective of the Convention, the goals of the Paris Agreement and the SDGs, while ensuring the right to development and enabling efforts to eradicate poverty, as well as synergies with other multilateral environmental agreements such as the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. A group of Parties proposed to adopt a holistic approach in the implementation of the Paris Agreement whereby enhanced ambition shall only be achieved by recognizing different starting points reflecting the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, based on enhanced means of implementation and support by developed countries, and facilitated by strengthened international cooperation.

448. Some Parties noted the need to recognize the needs and special circumstances of developing countries, including the special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs. One Party underscored the importance of an enhanced understanding of what is fair and ambitious in terms of collective climate action.

449. Parties provided specific views and ideas on how to enhance international cooperation for climate action through:

- (a) Cooperative initiatives and partnerships;
- (b) Cooperation in various thematic areas of climate action;
- (c) Engagement of non-Party stakeholders in international cooperation;
- (d) Recognition of the importance of multilateralism and need to avoid discriminatory unilateral measures;
- (e) Cooperation in the use of instruments under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement;
- (f) Facilitation of synergies across intergovernmental processes;
- (g) Encouragement of greater cooperation between COP Presidencies.

450. One Party does not see a need for a standalone section on international cooperation, considering that actions on international cooperation should be covered in section C.

Cooperative initiatives and partnerships

451. Most Parties highlighted the importance of bilateral and multilateral initiatives and partnerships as part of international cooperation, noting that a significant number of such initiatives by Parties and non-Party stakeholders have been launched and/or expanded on since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and that more effective international cooperation and credible initiatives can contribute to bridging emissions and implementation gaps. Some Parties noted that such initiatives should include those that are responsive to the priorities and needs of developing countries and provide support for members of those initiatives to achieve their objectives. One Party underlined that there are opportunities for more effective and inclusive engagement of multiple actors across sectors and levels of governance and that building coalitions and partnerships is a central tenet of climate action, including focusing on inclusive engagement of civil society, indigenous peoples and local communities, and the private sector to spur innovation and ambition. Another Party noted that while pledges and initiatives are useful tools for enhancing political momentum between countries, due to their nature that are open-ended, not clearly specified, not negotiated, and not fully agreed by all Parties, these efforts should be carefully reflected in the outcome.

Possible elements

452. Encourage Parties and organisations to participate in and support global initiatives relevant to them, including:

- (a) The Adaptation Research Alliance (ARA), which supports research on adaptation risks;
- (b) The Risk-Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP), which brings together stakeholders across climate, humanitarian, and development communities to drive a systemic shift to early action and make 1 billion people safer from disaster by 2025;
- (c) Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS), which initiative helps LDCs and SIDS build strong and sustainable early warning systems providing timely, accurate and accessible climate risk and weather services, through a people-centred approach;
- (d) Initiatives under the Power Breakthrough of the Breakthrough Agenda, such as the Green Grids Initiative and Energy Transition Council, which supports efforts to accelerate the energy transition away from unabated fossil fuels and to reach a global tripling of renewables capacity by 2030;
- (e) The Powering Past Coal Alliance and the UN No New Coal Compact which support work to deliver on the COP26 commitment calling for Parties to phase out unabated coal power;
- (f) The Clean Energy Transition Partnership, which was launched at COP26, encourages action towards phase out unabated fossil fuels where signatories end international public support for the unabated fossil fuel energy sector and prioritising support for the clean energy transition;
- (g) The Global Methane Pledge, which aims to collectively reduce global anthropogenic methane emissions by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030;

(h) Initiatives that promote energy efficiency like the COP26 Product Efficiency Call for Action;

(i) Encourage locally-led adaptation efforts, as is done through the LDC Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR), an LDC-led, LDC-owned initiative to develop a long-term vision for delivering a climate-resilient future.

453. Welcome the role of the Breakthrough Agenda as the international platform to coordinate sector-focused international cooperation for climate action as recognised by paragraph 91, decision 1/CMA.4 and by world leaders at COP26. Encouragement to Parties to use the Breakthrough Agenda priority actions to guide their sectoral plans and policies.

454. Emphasize the importance of international collaboration on clean technology transition to ensure affordability, availability and accessibility to all in this critical decade.

455. Welcome the progress being made towards meeting the Breakthrough Agenda goals through enhanced cooperation on standards, demand creation, finance, and research development and deployment.

456. Welcome the COP28 Presidency partnership with the Breakthrough Agenda to drive the development and deployment of clean technology in key emitting sectors;

457. Encourage the incoming COP29 and COP30 Presidents to work with the Breakthrough Agenda to continue this work and ensure there is continuity between Presidencies;

458. Recognize the Global Carbon Pricing Challenge and its aim to triple the coverage of carbon pricing globally, which is critical for greening finance flows, and encourage other Parties to participate and recognize the need to further uptake of carbon pricing measures;

459. Encourage promoting access to and knowledge sharing among plurilateral initiatives on capacity building such as the NDC Partnership;

460. Encourage the expansion of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), based on the lessons learnt of previous partnerships, and call for further innovative partnerships;

Thematic areas for cooperation

461. Almost all Parties provided suggestions on the various specific thematic areas where climate action could be facilitated through strengthened international cooperation.

Possible elements

462. Develop minimum standards for international cooperative initiatives concerning:

- (a) Quantifiable targets-goals;
- (b) Additionality-contribution of initiatives to national commitments;
- (c) Financing for actions under the initiatives; and
- (d) Reporting taking into account principles of the Convention and existing methodologies and processes;

463. Work on new technologies such as carbon capture and storage, hydrogen and electrification in transportation need to be accelerated including technology and knowledge transfer, also to enable countries to access the financial resources needed to contribute to global progress by developing such technologies of their own;

464. Establish global target on renewable energy and energy efficiency;

465. Implement the outcome of the work on agriculture.

466. Provide dedicated support for the implementation of NDC and NAPs, with simplified access;

467. Call for enhancing international cooperation in ocean-based action, including in mitigation and adaptation efforts related to cross-cutting areas, such as biodiversity preservation, fisheries management, and coastal and marine habitat restoration or other nature-based approaches;

468. Request Parties to facilitate, accelerate and strengthen international investment and cooperation on critical and emerging mitigation and adaptation technologies, including, inter alia, renewable energy generation and storage, batteries, energy-saving and energy-efficient technologies, hydrogen energy, smart grids, distributed grids, civil nuclear energy, advanced materials, carbon capture utilization and storage, etc.;

469. Support efforts to contribute to decarbonization on a global scale by promoting city-to-city cooperation as well as other bilateral and multilateral coordination, including by promoting endeavours towards achieving urban carbon neutrality through sharing knowledge and know-how on an individual city level, both bilaterally and multilaterally;

470. Support international cooperation activities that generate new co-benefits by enhancing engagement involving diverse stakeholders across all levels;

471. Support international investment and cooperation on critical and emerging mitigation and adaptation technologies, including, inter alia, renewable energy generation and storage, batteries, energy-saving and energy-efficient technologies, hydrogen energy, smart grids, distributed grids, civil nuclear energy, advanced materials, carbon capture utilization and storage, removal technologies, etc.;

472. Support international cooperation on technology development and transfer, enhanced innovation cooperation and capacity-building and knowledge transfer to strengthen technological innovation and capabilities in developing countries;

473. Share information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and implementation in relation to adaptation actions;

474. Strengthen institutional arrangements, including those under the Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to Parties;

475. Strengthen scientific knowledge on climate, including research, systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner that informs climate services and supports decision-making;

476. Encourage national, regional, and thematic stocktakes to be held in 2024 to help translate COP28 outcomes from the global level and assist countries in developing their next NDCs by 2025;

477. Call on Parties, multilateral development banks, and international financial institutions to strengthen international cooperation towards the support for the formulation and implementation of NDCs, namely the NDC Partnership or UNDP Climate Promise, as well as towards the support for the formulation and implementation of NAPs and Adaptation Communications;

478. Call on MDBs to set out concrete plans that align their portfolios with the Paris Agreement long-term goals on all financial resources;

479. Use policy advocacy at the development banks, supporting governments with climate finance advisers and through expanding access to financing instruments that aim to catalyse greater flows of private finance towards development outcomes, including climate and gender, in the IndoPacific.

Engagement of non-Party stakeholders in international cooperation

480. Many Parties recognized the importance of the engagement of non-Party stakeholders in international cooperation, including the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society, including women, youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change. One Party emphasized that Parties and non-Party stakeholders must continue to scale up bilateral and plurilateral initiatives and cooperation consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Another Party highlighted that in order to promote effective climate change adaptation at the global level, international cooperation involving not only Parties, but also various stakeholders have made progress, with examples include the contribution of international networks and information platforms to share knowledge and experience on adaptation.

Possible elements

481. Recognize the important role of non-Party stakeholders in delivering the goals of the Paris Agreement, such as indigenous peoples, local communities and civil society, including women, youth and children, local and regional governments, in addressing and responding to climate change and in contributing to progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement, and highlight the urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action;

482. Encourage increased cooperation between Parties and non-Party stakeholders in implementing the outcomes of the first GST;

483. Recognize the role of the High-Level Champions in enabling cooperation on climate action between Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including their work on Climate Action Pathways and 2030 Breakthroughs, as well as the Race to Zero, Race to Resilience, Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero;

484. Express appreciation of the High-Level Champions in their role of supporting non-Party stakeholders to participate effectively in the GST process;

485. Invite contributions by the High-Level Champions;

486. Call on the UNFCCC process and the High-Level Champions to incentivize international cooperation for climate action and support and to boost relevant initiatives, partnerships and launch new initiatives where gaps exist, also taking into account the findings of the latest Yearbook of Global Climate Action;

487. Invite the private sector to put forward voluntary commitments in the field of climate action;

488. Strengthen accountability and follow-through for climate action by governments, non-state actors and international institutions;

489. Encourage exchanges and international cooperation among non-Party stakeholders, including the private sector, research institutions, organizations, etc. at national, sub-national, regional, and local levels, including conducting joint research, personnel training, practical projects, technical exchanges, project investment, and standards cooperation etc.;

490. Enhance international cooperation for climate action and increase the role of the private sector in the implementation of the climate agenda, using the channels that exist under the UNFCCC, for example, webinars, workshops, submissions, as well as establish partnerships and launch initiatives;

491. Noting that economy, systems-wide and whole-of-society approaches as well as creativity and innovation are needed, invite Parties and NPS to enhance international cooperation through relevant initiatives, pacts, coalitions and partnerships in key sectors and systems to raise their profile and garner support behind them, such as:

(a) Initiatives launched at COP26 and COP27 (e.g., on methane, deforestation, agriculture, technology, adaptation, sustainable finance etc.).

(b) The Breakthrough Agenda and related commitments in key sectors (such as power, transport, steel, hydrogen, and agriculture).

(c) Cooperation mechanisms such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and Climate Clubs.

(d) Initiatives spurring the transition to low and zero emission products, based on common standards in topics such as Green Public Procurement;

(e) Emphasize that joint activities and initiatives by Parties and NPS can strengthen efforts for systemic transformations, investing and transitions from high to low emissions and climate-resilient development;

Recognition of the importance of multilateralism and need to avoid discriminatory unilateral measures

492. Some Parties emphasized the need to strengthen multilateralism in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement,

including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, noting that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Some Parties noted that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Some Parties expressed the concern that rising protectionism would lead to increased costs of implementing the Paris Agreement, undermine Parties' capabilities and progress of climate response, and delay climate action, especially in developing countries, and requested that unilateralism and protectionism in all forms be abandoned, including acts and policies to decouple and de-risk so as to lock in the economic and technological gaps between developed and developing countries. One Party noted that international cooperation must be carried out in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty, non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs (no intervention), mutual benefit, aimed at achieving national interests and mutual welfare, and carried out on the basis of mutual agreement.

493. Some non-Party stakeholders highlighted the potential for subnational action and collaboration to contribute to global emission reduction goals. In addition to the synergies created between national governments and regions, individual cities, regions, companies, and industries is acknowledged to significantly contribute to the full implementation of GHG emissions reduction targets.

494. A few of the non-Party stakeholder submissions emphasized the potential to enhance ambition in a realistic and concrete manner by efficient in-country mechanisms, such as public consultations, for international cooperation.

495. Many non-Party stakeholders called for more transparency in climate finance instruments, and creating more open systems providing information on the types of funds, destination, effectiveness, impact, and budgetary execution of investments, allowing for follow-up and evaluation of the real contribution of the use of climate finance resources.

496. A few of the non-Party stakeholder submissions reiterated the importance for driving progress in clean technology adoption by aligning public and private interventions strategically and innovating the way countries and businesses work together.

497. Many non-Party stakeholders acknowledged the huge potentials of the international financial architecture. This includes aligning regulatory frameworks, bridging the gap between developed and developing countries' investment needs, and mobilizing climate finance to support the transition goals of Parties. Additionally, there is a need to review and enhance the governance arrangements of the international financial architecture, including international financial institutions and multilateral groups of financial regulators.

498. Some non-Party stakeholders reiterated that the opportunities for enhancing international cooperation including the use of robust multidisciplinary science and technical evidence in assessing climate mitigation measures, and the integration of the ocean-based and nature based measures and knowledge-sharing in updated NDCs and national strategies, the integration of indigenous knowledge systems and local practices with science and policy, and the strengthening of ocean-based systematic observation, research, and data management.

499. A few of the non-Party stakeholder submissions emphasized the need to enhance synergies with UN human rights organizations and institutions across sectors, and reaffirmed the commitment to upholding the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international human rights law and standards.

500. Several non-Party stakeholders highlighted that the GST and GGA are the most relevant international mechanisms to track transboundary climate risks globally and across sectors, and relevant frameworks and methodologies need to be identified.

Possible elements

501. Reaffirm that Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all

Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change;

502. Also reaffirm that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade;

503. Express serious concerns that measures imposed by some countries, including, *inter alia*, sanctions on low-carbon products, restrictions on technology investment and cooperation, green barriers, discriminatory legislation, plurilateral constraints, etc., which are not aligned with the principles of the Paris Agreement, in particular equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, as well as WTO rules;

504. Stress that the rising protectionism will lead to increased costs of implementing the Paris Agreement, undermine Parties' capabilities and progress of climate response, and delay global low carbon and climate resilient transition, especially in developing countries;

505. Note with grave concerns that if protectionism policies continue, estimated solar module prices in 2030 would be approximately 20%–25% higher compared to a future with globalized supply chains; global total solar cell and module production and installation will decrease by 160–370 GW; trade barrier reduction by half from the 2017 level will increase global net carbon emissions mitigation potential by 4–12 GtCO_{2e} by 2060, while extra trade barrier imposition will result in global net carbon emissions mitigation potential decreasing by up to 3–4 GtCO_{2e} by 2060;

506. Oppose unilateralism and protectionism in all forms, including green acts and policies to decouple and de-risk so as to lock in the economic and technological gaps between developed and developing countries; requests relevant Parties to remove such legislation, executive orders and measures to ensure transparent, inclusive, non-discriminatory level playing field as well as stable and inclusive global supply chain to facilitate global green and low-carbon development;

507. Express serious concerns with green trade barriers and border carbon pricing instruments that impose “one-size-fits-all” requirements based on inequitable, non-transparent and arbitrary assessment; requests relevant Parties to remove such measures and to contribute any revenues that have been previously collected to the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism under UNFCCC;

508. Request Parties to remove sanctions and restrictions on green and climate-friendly goods, services, industries, technologies, investment and cooperation, and exempt such goods, services, industries, technologies, investments and cooperation, etc, from policies and measures adopted by Parties that may restrict and distort international trade, investment, and cooperation;

509. Request relevant Parties to remove such executive orders, acts and policies that decouple and de-risk so as to lock in the economic and technological gaps between developed and developing countries and to ensure transparent, inclusive, non-discriminatory level playing field as well as stable and inclusive global supply chain to facilitate global green and low-carbon development;

510. Request relevant Parties that impose trade barriers and boarder carbon pricing instruments of “one size-fits-all” requirements based on inequitable, non-transparent and arbitrary assessment to remove such measures and to contribute any revenues that have been previously collected to the operational entities of the Financial Mechanism under UNFCCC;

511. Urge Parties to remove sanctions and restrictions on green and climate-friendly goods, services, industries, technologies, investment and cooperation, and exempt such goods, services, industries, technologies, investments and cooperation, etc, from policies and measures adopted by Parties that may restrict and distort international trade, investment, and cooperation.

Cooperation in the use of instruments under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

512. A number of Parties elaborated on the relevance and importance of international collaboration in the use of cooperation instruments stipulated under Article 6 of the Parties

Agreement, noting that Article 6 has the potential to enable countries to work together to achieve faster, deeper cuts in emissions, but that ensuring this further ambition is realised requires credible market participation strategies to facilitate market access and avoid overselling risks. In that context, a number of Parties noted the need for significant capacity building to enhance reporting capabilities of developing country Parties' to ease the reporting processes required when engaging in Article 6. A group of Parties noted that Article 6 cooperative approaches must be ambitious and go beyond what has happened historically by actively discouraging developed country Parties from depending on the Global South to provide carbon sinks and that more time is needed to sufficiently assess the potential of the Article and its contributions to a global stocktake.

Possible elements

513. Call on Parties to recognise the important role of carbon pricing in delivering the Paris goals on mitigation and support through carbon taxes and trading schemes;

514. Urge Parties to finalize the last set of decisions on Article 6 at COP28, which is yet to be implemented further and important technical details are still to be decided, noting the important contribution that it could make to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;

515. Urge Parties to establish rules where market accounting and crediting are reliable, credible and can secure environmental integrity as well as a clear ambitious approach to ensure that Article 6 contributes to net-zero CO₂ emissions around 2050 along with strong reductions in other GHG;

516. Urge all Parties to increase their use and ambition of carbon pricing; for those Parties that already implement carbon pricing (e.g. carbon taxes or emission trading schemes), urge Parties to revisit and strengthen pricing measures to ensure they align with a 1.5°C pathway;

517. Urge all Parties participating and expecting to participate in Article 6 to disclose all relevant information;

518. Call on Parties to recognise the importance of embedding transparency of Article 6 information, including around the review process status and results, via the public interface of the Centralised Accounting and Reporting Platform;

519. Urge Parties to support the necessary capacity-building to ensure proper implementation of Article 6 activities in accordance with the rules, in particular with regard to institutional arrangements for corresponding adjustments, reporting, and tracking of ITMOs necessary for Article 6 implementation;

520. Note that non-market approaches operationalize the true spirit of cooperation and provide an important venue of international cooperation to address climate change, including mitigation and adaptation, in order to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement in the context of the defence of the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, the protection of Mother Earth, and climate justice.

Facilitation of synergies across intergovernmental processes

521. Some Parties elaborated on the importance of recognizing and addressing synergies and linkages across action undertaken through various intergovernmental processes on a global, regional and domestic level, for example in addressing such issues climate change and biodiversity loss, in order to avoid duplications of efforts and to use available resources more efficiently.

Possible elements

522. Recommend to enhance international cooperation between Parties, non-Party stakeholders and across multilateral environmental conventions and agreements to take advantage of synergies (e.g., UNCBD and its Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, UNCCD and its Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) principles, the SDGs, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction), including for strengthening partnerships to internationally support the development and implementation of mitigation and adaptation policies, and including with a view to avert, minimize and address loss and damage due to the adverse effects of climate change;

523. Recognize target 8 of the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) to minimise the impact of climate change and ocean acidification on biodiversity and increase its resilience through mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction actions, including through nature-based solutions and/or ecosystem-based approaches, while minimizing negative and fostering positive impacts of climate action on biodiversity;

524. Recognize the GBF commitments to deliver global targets including at least 30% of global land and 30% of global ocean to be protected by 2030, 30% of degraded ecosystems to be under restoration by 2030 and a global commitment to mobilise \$200bn a year of nature finance from domestic and international sources by 2030, from all sources both domestic and international, including through a new fund, under the Global Environment Facility, to tackle the nature crisis;

525. Acknowledge the intermediate targets for 2030 and 2040 under the 2030 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) GHG Strategy and the next steps and timelines for policy measures to deliver on further emissions reductions, and commit to supporting global efforts under the 2030 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) GHG Strategy, underpinned by national or regional policies and reviewed within the UNFCCC process, to peak and reduce GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possible in line with keeping 1.5°C in reach and to reach net-zero GHG emissions by or around 2050 while acknowledging that this process will contribute to the balance of sources and sinks required by Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Paris Agreement;

526. Commit to supporting accelerated global efforts to achieve the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)'s goal of net zero emissions in international aviation by 2050, including making an effort for promoting and introducing sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), introducing new technologies and improving operations, also building in ICAO's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA);

527. Recognize the work of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 to support the national establishment and strengthening of national disaster loss databases;

528. Acknowledge relevant work of the World Meteorological Organization, including the Global Climate Observing System programme (GCOS), and stress the need for sustained long-term systematic observation of the climate system and enhanced delivery of climate services and early warning systems;

529. Support the work of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on establishing a globally coordinated system of greenhouse gas monitoring, with the utilization by the Parties to the UNFCCC in mind;

530. Recognize the need for enhancing climate-related data and knowledge as well as accessible information, in particular in vulnerable countries and communities;

531. Invite partners, institutions, organisations and other operating entities within UNFCCC and outside the United Nations climate process to support implementation of GST1 and align broader practices and policies with ambitious climate action;

532. Strongly support the United Nations Secretary-General's call for a universal coverage of life saving early warning systems within the next five years and contribute financially through the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative (CREWS) and the Systematic Observations Financing Facility (SOFF), and call to scale up other relevant initiatives;

Encouragement of greater cooperation between COP Presidencies

533. One Party noted that to support action in this critical decade COP Presidencies must work with Parties to sustain momentum and accountability in a manner that focuses on closing gaps in ambition and implementation.

Possible element

534. Encourage greater cooperation between COP Presidencies to drive meaningful action over this critical decade.

E. Guidance and way forward

535. Almost all Parties submitted their views on the guidance that could be formulated through the GST outcome and on possible next steps after the conclusion of the first GST. One Party did not see a need for a standalone section on guidance or the way forward, considering these issues should be covered in section C.

2. Guidance

536. Regarding guidance, Parties provided suggestions for:

- (a) Guidance concerning NDCs;
- (b) Guidance for the implementation of other existing processes or workstreams.

Guidance / NDCs

Possible elements

537. Reaffirm the commitment to the Paris Agreement and its full and balanced implementation towards achieving its purpose and long-term goals, and ultimately enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective;

538. Reiterate that each Party's successive NDC will represent a progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;

539. Call upon all Parties to enhance their actions and support through their NDCs and international cooperation in line with recommendations emanating from the process;

540. Recall the need to implement Article 14, para.3 of the Paris Agreement and para. 17 of decision 19/CMA.1;

541. Encourage Parties to set out how their NDC is informed by the GST in the relevant section of the information necessary to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of their NDC;

542. Call on Parties to indicate how the GST has informed NDC updates upon submission, as per the information necessary for clarity, transparency, and understanding;

543. Invite Parties to prepare and submit their next round of NDCs by 2025, based on the outcomes of the first GST and to take full consideration of the mitigation outcome of the GST when preparing these NDCs;

544. Invite countries to take into account the CMA GST decision while updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their NDCs;

545. Include in the NDCs to be submitted by 2025 a statement on how their NDC has been informed by outputs from the GST;

546. Invite Parties to indicate how GST has informed NDC update upon submission in 2025;

547. Ensure that countries address and include GST recommendations within NDCs and long-term strategies with reference to:

(a) The need to ensure that targets under the NDCs are based on the best available science, considering equity, just transition and climate justice;

(b) The opportunities and solutions with respect to mitigation and adaptation, based on lessons learned not only from good practices but also from what keeps us away from a more resilient world;

(c) The integrated approach between mitigation and adaptation that allows, where appropriate, to have a greater impact in terms of climate action;

(d) The efforts made to integrate climate commitments with development policies;

(e) The NDC should also be the vehicle to make visible efforts complementary to the national goals, reflecting the efforts of subnational governments and other non-state actors within the country. Monitoring of these targets would be done through the NAZCA platform by these actors.

548. Call on Parties to prepare and communicate NDCs and LT-LEDS, including quantified, economy-wide mitigation targets for all GHG, that are keeping global warming to 1.5°C in reach.

549. Encourage Parties and NPS to use the information from the Technical Dialogue of the GST1 for planning and implementation of enhanced climate action;

550. Encourage Parties, in a nationally determined manner, and keeping in mind national circumstances, to adopt best practices from the technical annex to the Synthesis Report of the Technical Dialogue under the global stocktake;

551. Invite Parties to take into account lessons learned during the GST with regard to the features of the NDCs during the upcoming consideration of further guidance on features of NDCs at CMA6 (2024);

552. Invite Parties to take into account this GST in their next NDCs, and align their NDCs with pathways to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees;

553. Inform Parties to include the ocean in the second round of NDCs, on the basis of the best available science;

554. Call on Parties to inform themselves from GST outputs to update, in nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the Paris Agreement and in enhancing international cooperation;

555. Call upon Parties, informed by the outcome of the global stocktake, to update and enhance, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement, as well as to enhance international cooperation for climate action;

556. Reiterate Article 3 of the Paris Agreement on progression from previous commitments is central to enhancing ambition in commitments, in the context of Articles 4.3 and 4.4 which recognizes the principle of CBDR-RC in light of national circumstances and the obligation of developed countries to take the lead;

557. Note that enhancing ambition should be complemented with efforts to close the 'implementation gap', and address the enabling conditions, particularly means of implementation to spur ambitious efforts from developing countries;

558. Reflect in very clear terms the quantified benchmarks that best available science has recommended including new global mitigation pathways to 1.5°C without overshoot that would not perpetuate global inequality and maintain the relative underdevelopment of developing countries;

559. Provide clear guidance to developed countries in updating and enhancing their NDCs to include consideration of the inadequacy of their pre-2020 targets against recommendations from the best available science, in both emission reductions and support provided to developing countries;

560. Provide clear messages on addressing unilateral response measures and recommendations (including good practices) on how to address the negative impacts from them;

561. Encourage Parties to develop NDCs to 2035 that are absolute targets aligned with the 1.5°C pathway of 60% reductions by 2035 relative to 2019 level, are economy-wide, and cover all GHGs, and include revisited 2030 targets;

562. Call for emission reductions that are aligned with 1.5°C, considering the recommendation of IPCC AR6 to reduce GHG emissions globally by 43% by 2030 and by 60% by 2035 compared to 2019 levels;

563. Call on Parties to adopt economy-wide NDCs, covering all sectors and gases, and absolute emission reduction targets;
564. Call for NDCs that support peaking by 2025;
565. Call on all Parties to apply common time frames;
566. Call on all countries to report on progress in energy transition as part of their NDCs, in particular efforts to phase down unabated coal and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies;
567. Call on Parties to provide clearer information on fairness and ambition in the light of their national circumstances in their NDCs;
568. Call on Parties to describe how their NDCs are aligned with the 1.5°C objective;
569. Call on Parties to incorporate GST1 outcomes in NDCs to be submitted well ahead of COP30 in 2025 in line with Articles 4.3 and 4.9 of the Paris Agreement and 4/CMA.1 Annex I for Parties to detail how their NDCs have been informed by the outputs of the GST, including how they are in line with 1.5°C pathways and include all GHG and economy-wide targets;
570. Call on Parties to submit NDCs to 2035 informed by the GST outcome, in line with Article 4 paragraph 9 of the Paris Agreement, at the United Nations Secretariat General mandated summit in paragraph 17 of 19/CMA.1, 9 to 12 months ahead of COP30, and in time for the NDC synthesis report publication in 2025;
571. Reiterate the invitation of Parties to present their NDCs, informed by the outcome of the GST, at a special event held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
572. Encourage further cooperation and engagement at all levels on the preparation of NDCs throughout 2024 and ahead of the deadline in paragraph 25 of Decision 1/CP.21, including through discussions within existing mandates of the UNFCCC, as appropriate, and a COP29 ministerial meeting on NDC and LT-LEDs;
573. Reiterate the urgent need for Parties to increase their efforts to collectively reduce emissions through accelerated action and implementation of domestic mitigation measures in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, paying particular attention to how this will enable them to implement their highest ambition NDCs;
574. Call on Ministers to present their upcoming plans for new 2035 NDCs and updated 2030 NDCs at the United Nations General Assembly in 2024;
575. Establish a space for Parties to exchange lessons learnt on NDC best practice, including based on GST outcomes;
576. Highlight opportunities, challenges, and best practices for enhanced implementation of current NDCs;
577. Establish a dedicated programme for supporting developing countries for NDC development and implementation in line with the invitation to enhance NDCs;
578. Establish a mandated workshop or event in 2024 to provide Parties with an opportunity to discuss their plans to set their next NDCs in a manner informed by the findings of GST1;
579. Reiterate that effective implementation of climate actions by developing country Parties depends on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments related to financial resources, transfer of technology, and capacity building support; and urge developed country Parties to provide new, additional, public, grant-based and concessional financial resources to assist developing country Parties in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention;
580. Strengthen capacity building and technical assistance programme for NDC development in line with the invitation to improve NDCs;

581. Establish a capacity building and technical assistance programme for NDC development in line with the invitation to improve NDCs;

582. Request the incoming Presidency to convene a ministerial meeting at COP29 to consider progress on the development and implementation of 1.5°C aligned NDC and LT-LEDs;

583. Invite current/incoming Presidencies of COP 28, COP 29, COP 30 to collaborate to build political momentum that culminates with the submission of updated NDCs informed by GST1 in 2025.

Guidance / Implementation of other existing processes or workstreams

584. Most Parties provided specific suggestions for the guidance that the GST process could provide to existing processes or workstreams under the UNFCCC. These processes and work programmes included mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, just transition and means of implementation (finance, technology and capacity building).

Possible elements

585. Give guidance to pertinent processes within and outside the UNFCCC in a manner to urgently reduce emissions and put the world on a pathway to 1.5°C, such as the work under the Mitigation Work Programme, the Article 2.1.c Dialogue, as well as the Work Programme on Just Transition;

586. Invite existing workstreams and Constituted Bodies to implement the outcomes of GST1 in their future work;

587. Invite existing workstreams and Constituted Bodies, as relevant, to provide qualitative/quantitative indicators as appropriate, drawing as much as possible on existing frameworks within the Paris Agreement's architecture and on external work, including the global indicator framework for the SDGs;

588. Take into consideration Africa's unique developmental circumstances and send clear recommendations and guidance to all actors both in and outside of the UNFCCC process on ensuring a just transition and opportunities for doing so;

589. Utilize the Mitigation Work Programme as a forum to follow up on mitigation recommendations from to achieve the goals of Article 2.1(a) of the Agreement, to share Parties' experiences in this regard, based on the information provided by the Parties under the Article 4.8 of the Agreement and decision 4/CMA.1 on how the Party's preparation of its NDC has been informed by the outcomes of the GST;

590. Invite the Mitigation Work Programme and the High-level Ministerial Roundtable on pre-2030 Ambition, to take up elements of the GST outcome aiming at closing the mitigation ambition and implementation gap through concrete action, and for domestic decision-making, planning, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of mitigation action to take up GST1 results;

591. Call on all Parties to align their existing climate plans as well as policies, measures, and fiscal spending with emission reduction pathways in line with the 1.5°C limit, as every increment of a degree matters;

592. Introduce ambitious targets aligned with 1.5°C pathways and track systems transformations in key sectors, including calling on all Parties to implement domestic policy reforms to dismantle barriers and introduce incentives for ambitious climate action, and identify and adopt a standardized methodology for Life Cycle Emissions Assessments (LCA) for key products;

593. Urge all Parties to review their LT-LEDs to ensure alignment with best available science and a 1.5 °C pathway, and for those that have not already done so to come forward with LT-LEDs by end of 2024 that set out a pathway to net zero by or around mid-century, and request to the secretariat to publish an LT-LEDs synthesis report ahead of COP 29;

594. Call for Parties to integrate net zero objectives as part of their LT-LEDs;

595. Encourage Parties to develop materials and tools that are tailored to local cultures and contexts and encourage active participation in order to empower local communities to take ownership of climate actions;
596. Assist developing country Parties in identifying effective adaptation practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging good practices;
597. Focus on where adaptation action may be lacking, addressing financial gaps, exploring technology transfer, and following the principles from the Paris Agreement and 19/CMA.1 to help the GST outcome to become a powerful tool to guide countries in improving their plans, adjusting their policies, and taking stronger climate actions to meet the goals set by the Paris Agreement;
598. Encourage Parties to develop and submit new or updated Adaptation Communications, in line with Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, making use of the Supplementary guidance for adaptation communications prepared by the Adaptation Committee;
599. Encourage Parties to make use of the outcomes of the Glasgow-Sharm el Sheikh Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation, including the Framework for the GGA [to be adopted at COP 28] in the development of their adaptation reporting vehicles, including National Adaptation Plans, Adaptation Communications, Biennial Transparency Reports, etc.;
600. Encourage the development of Adaptation Communications, as a way of sharing experiences and informing support;
601. Invite Parties to apply the Adaptation Communications guidance developed by the Adaptation Committee;
602. Call for enhanced support to NAPs formulation and implementation, with simplified access to LDCs;
603. Invite the Adaptation Committee to appropriately follow up on the GST outcomes related to NAPs;
604. Link to outcomes on the GGA framework under the Glasgow – Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the GGA at COP 28;
605. Reiterate that the GGA framework will inform enhanced action along the four steps of the adaptation policy cycle and the mainstreaming of adaptation in all (national) investments, strategies and plans;
606. Streamline the adaptation agenda under CMA, SBI and SBSTA and address the current fragmentation of the agenda going forward;
607. Call on Parties to increase resilience and adaptive capacity and to reduce climate risks through implementing and strengthening their domestic adaptation policy cycles, and by enhanced ambition on adaptation documented in adaptation plans and strategies, including in updated Adaptation Communications published at least every five years;
608. Encourage efforts to build capacity to support country-led development of national climate finance strategies which ensure public sector policies are consistent with climate objectives as well as other sustainable development objectives;
609. Invite Parties to use and support NAPs as well as other tools to scale up adaptation action;
610. Encourage further strengthening of the broader landscape of actions contributing to avert, minimize and address loss and damage, including progress on funding arrangements including a fund, in connection with the work done under the Transitional Committee, the Santiago Network on loss and damage and the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism, as well as initiatives outside the UNFCCC including the Global Shield against Climate Risks and the United Nations Secretary-General's Early Warnings for All, connecting local, national and international actions and actors;

611. Improve the effectiveness and durability of adaptation and loss and damage actions through:

- (a) Early warning systems;
- (b) Emergency preparedness;
- (c) Slow onset events;
- (d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
- (e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;
- (f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;
- (g) Non-economic losses; and
- (h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.

612. Provide key messages for scaling up ambition on MOI and support, and sending strong signals for enhancing international cooperation, including:

(a) Quantification of the cost for implementation and what level of implementation the current levels of delivery of support would lead to, noting pledges to date have been in billions, whereas the needs are in trillions;

(b) Opportunities for bridging the gap based on equity, fairness and a just transition (transformative and implementable actions);

(c) Highlight gaps and inequalities in current implementation between the regions and within, especially on delivery of renewable energy, access to finance, and linked development goals;

(d) Send clear political signals on reforms to the global financial architecture and necessary ecosystem that will support the transitions.

613. Further build on existing and new initiatives in support of Parties such as the Early Warnings for All Initiative (EWA) and the WMO coordinated Global Greenhouse Gas Watch (G3W);

614. Commit to enhanced quality, effectiveness and transparency of finance, recognizing the need for financing to be high-quality, efficient and accountable and further recognizing the need for effective monitoring, evaluation and learning for measuring results and to ensure innovation and reflect best practice;

615. Call on Parties to take into account the GST CMA decision while making financial pledges - doubling of adaptation finance, subsequent GCF replenishment, finance to the L&D Fund, and in ongoing deliberations of the NCQG;

616. Call on Parties to mobilize scaled-up finance, implementation of GGA and addressing loss and damage;

617. Invite developed country Parties to demonstrate progress at COP 29 on how they are meeting the commitment to double adaptation finance by 2025;

618. Call on Parties to improve the overall climate finance landscape also with regards to topics such as access, efficiency and effectiveness of climate finance mobilized by developed and developing countries, transparency from both sides, contributor and recipient countries;

619. Build on the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and to exchange views and enhance understanding on its complementarity with Article 9, an ambitious work programme for climate finance and the integration of climate considerations into all finance flows;

620. Decide to create a dedicated space in the CMA to discuss the alignment of all financial flows in the context of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, including the development of guidance for Parties and NPS on how to further align financial flows with low GHG emissions and climate resilient development pathways;

621. Develop (a) framework(s) of indicators, tools, analytical models and tracking systems that could support countries and private actors to monitor the implementation of the objectives of Article 2.1(c), respectfully to different national circumstances;
622. Invite Parties to identify and implement policies and measures aimed at reallocating finance flows and investments in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, towards a low GHG emissions and climate resilient development;
623. Invite Parties to provide increased climate finance and contribute to making finance flows consistent with low GHG and climate-resilient development.
624. Encourage Parties to introduce sectoral approaches and milestones to develop enabling conditions for achieving systemic transformations;
625. Encourage Parties to integrate the TNAs in their policy-making process to improve coherence and to make the most efficient use of in-country resources and international funding;
626. Encourage Parties to follow-up on the TNAs by further promoting the development and implementation of economically, environmentally and socially sound mitigation and adaptation technology project proposals for example by also developing TAPs;
627. Encourage Parties to incorporate the experience of implementing the adaptation and mitigation technologies identified in TNAs and TAPs, that require overcoming barriers, as well as employing sectoral and multisectoral expert teams for planning, budgeting, financing, and technology operation and maintenance, into the NDC process;
628. Encourage Parties to continue supporting efforts to enhance capacities across all regions and sectors of the economy and at all levels to address the gaps in reaching the mitigation and adaptation long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, with the objective of responding adequately to climate change challenges, addressing vulnerabilities and improving resilience while transforming the society and economy to achieve SDGs;
629. Encourage Parties to integrate robust monitoring, evaluation and learning mechanisms into capacity-building initiatives ensuring that efforts remain responsive to evolving needs, challenges and opportunities. Further encourage Parties to promote coordinated approach to capacity-building, serving the long-term strategies and to foster regional networks that facilitate cross-border collaboration and capacity-building among the neighbouring countries facing similar climate challenges;
630. Encourage Parties to engage with the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building (PCCB) and its Network to use existing capacity-building instruments, and to use the PCCB Toolkit to support the efforts of developing countries to identify and address capacity-building needs and gaps.

3. Way forward

631. Almost all Parties provided their views on possible next steps after the conclusion of the first GST. Some Parties suggested that the section on the way forward recall concluding elements such as the continued implementation of the Paris Agreement through the lens of equity and CBDR-RC, the importance of enhanced means of implementation and support by developed countries, strengthened international cooperation and holistic approaches in all future implementation. One Party indicated its view that existing enhanced transparency framework already provides adequate space, therefore there is no need to establish any new follow-up or monitoring mechanism. The suggestions covered a broad area of possible follow-up work, such as:

- (a) Follow-up by Parties;
- (b) Follow-up by UNFCCC bodies and their chairs or facilitators;
- (c) Follow-up by other stakeholders.

Way forward / Follow-up by Parties

Possible elements

632. Invite Parties to consider progress made on implementing the outcomes of the GST at ministerial meetings at COP 29;
633. Invite Parties to submit their first BTR, to enhance transparency and enable collective accountability;
634. Recommend to Parties to report in their biennial transparency reports on how their implementation was strengthened by the GST recommendations;
635. Recall that all Parties should submit their first BTRs under the enhanced transparency framework by the submission deadline at the end of 2024, and subsequently every two years in a reliable and timely manner;
636. Recognize the urgency of completing the transition to the Enhanced Transparency Framework by the end of 2024, recognizing that robust measurement, reporting and verification systems to strengthen confidence and enable climate ambition, transparency and accountability;
637. Encourage Parties to complete their reporting under the enhanced transparency framework when it enters into force in 2024 to provide accountability for implementing the outcomes of the GST;
638. Encourage timely implementation of the ETF to progress outcomes from the first GST;
639. Invite Parties to timely submit 1st and 2nd BTRs (before the end of 2024 and 2026 respectively) to provide a clear understanding of climate change action and support in order to inform the 2nd GST on the outcomes of the ETF;
640. Provide capacity-building support for the submission of BTRs in the light of different national circumstances as part of the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework, including the preparation of inventories, leveraging existing financial and technical support effectively;
641. Recall 19/CMA.1, para. 17 inviting Parties to present their NDCs, informed by the outcome of the global stocktake, at a special event held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
642. Recall the invitation to Parties to present their NDCs, informed by the outcome of the GST, at a special event held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in particular those countries who have the most to contribute to the achievement of the 1.5°C objective;
643. Welcome the invitation for Parties to present their NDCs, informed by the outcome of the GST, at a special event held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and look forward to the event;
644. Encourage national, regional, and thematic GSTs to help inform NDCs and other national commitments;
645. Call on the COP 28 Presidency and COP 29 Incoming Presidency to work together to ensure a robust follow-up to the GST outcome, and invite them to identify where the follow up the first GST under the Paris Agreement should take place;
646. Invite Parties and relevant organizations to submit to the UNFCCC Secretariat, by 1 February 2024, information on their experience, and lessons learned, through the conduct of the first GST;
647. Request the UNFCCC secretariat to prepare a report on lessons learned from the conduct and areas for further work to be taken into account for the second GST;
648. Call for incoming Presidencies to work together, coordinate their agendas better, focusing on urgent needs to achieve the Paris goals;
649. Call on the UNFCCC Executive Secretary to lead efforts to review the agenda of the CMA, with a view to rationalizing the agenda;

650. Invite Parties and relevant organizations to submit to the secretariat, by 1 February 2024, information on their experience, and lessons learned, through the conduct of the first GST.

Way forward / UNFCCC bodies and their chairs or facilitators

Possible elements

651. Request the GST co-facilitators and co-chairs, supported by the secretariat, to produce a report on lessons learned from the first GST cycle and to consult Parties on the design of the next cycle;

652. Prepare a report to the CMA on progress in the implementation of GST recommendations in general terms, should be guided by the relevant technical and synthesis reports mandated to the UNFCCC Secretariat;

653. Prepare a synthesis report on how the Parties have considered the recommendations from the GST in their national NDCs and LTS implementation processes (information reported in BTRs);

654. Prepare a technical report on how the process of enhancing synergies with other Conventions has progressed;

655. Request the secretariat to prepare a report on lessons learned from the conduct of GST1 and areas for further work to be taken into account for GST 2;

656. Invite the secretariat to prepare an update on progress in implementing the GST1 outcome as part of their annual NDC Synthesis Report;

657. Mandate constituted bodies to consider in their analysis and country support activities the recommendations derived from the GST;

658. Invite existing workstreams and Constituted Bodies to implement the outcomes of GST1 in their future work;

659. Invite existing workstreams and Constituted Bodies, as relevant, to provide qualitative/quantitative indicators as appropriate, drawing as much as possible on existing frameworks within the Paris Agreement's architecture and on external work, including the global indicator framework for the SDGs;

660. Organize a process to ensure accountability and transparency of action and announcement with a clear follow up immediately after 2023 as an agenda item for SB60 and lead up the next round of NDC for monitoring progress on raising ambition in line with 1.5°C;

661. Open spaces during the sessions of the subsidiary bodies as well as the CMAs for non-state actors to report on how they have incorporated GST recommendations in the communication and implementation of their commitments;

662. Create an open dialogue space to promote the flow of information between implementing sectors that can contribute to the achievement of the established goals in the current NDCs;

663. Build a political process and enhance trust across all Parties towards the substantial enhancement of NDCs in 2025. All Parties, and especially those that have the most to contribute to emission reductions, should be brought together to share in advance, by the end of 2024, reflections on their NDCs in 2025. A dialogue should be set in place to build trust among Parties and encourage each other to step up ambition collectively, with a view to filling the gap to the 1.5°C. Such a dialogue could run from 2023 to 2025, to accompany Parties in their process of defining their NDC enhancement;

664. Mandate a space for Parties to discuss and exchange experiences on the formulation and development of their NDCs, through a dedicated workshop or specific agenda item;

665. Include in the agenda of SB 60 an item on follow-up of the first GST under the Paris Agreement;

666. Recognize the need to deliver on the agreed mandate on increasing the efficiency of the UNFCCC process towards enhancing ambition and strengthening implementation;

667. Highlight that the UNFCCC process should be a platform uniting all actors, including other international organisations, in fulfilling what science and the GST tells us is required, noting that this will also require streamlining of the UNFCCC process;
668. Strengthen climate governance across scales as an enabler of ambitious climate action, noting that effective climate governance enhances policy monitoring and evaluation, regulatory certainty, prioritizes inclusive, transparent and equitable decision-making, and improves access to finance and technology;
669. Invite the CMA to identify lessons learned for future GSTs at SB60, to be conducted with the assistance of the SBI and the SBSTA, which will establish a joint contact group on this matter;
670. Establish linkages and synergy with existing institutional arrangements and subsidiary bodies under the Convention, being informed by the work of the existing subsidiary bodies and processes to avoid duplication;
671. Share experiences and take stock of the progress by institutional arrangements on accelerating the implementation of past decisions, supported by means of implementation and support in terms of finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building by developed country Parties;
672. Develop recommendations to the COP on further guidance on the institutional arrangements under the Convention; and improving the scale, scope, speed and delivery of means of implementation;
673. Continue joint efforts towards a strengthened global governance under the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol and its Paris Agreement;
674. Ensure that the second GST considers information on how Parties' preparations of their next round of NDCs have been informed by the outcomes of the GST, which could be included as part of the existing sources of inputs, as specified in paragraphs 36 and 37 of Decision 19/CMA.1;
675. Look forward to the second global stocktake.

Way forward / other stakeholders

Possible elements

676. Invite the IPCC to continue providing relevant and timely inputs to the GST;
677. Invite the IPCC to continue to provide relevant information to Parties, taking into account the work of the UNFCCC and in particular the GST in determining its future products and assessment cycles, and request future IPCC assessment report cycles to be fully aligned with future GST;
678. Call upon enhanced efforts by international community to close the knowledge gaps in the first global stocktake, in particular on adaptation, means of implementation and support;
679. Encourages active engagement and contributions of non-Party stakeholders in implementing the Paris Agreement;
680. Take note of the coalitions, pledges and action plans announced and documented and encourage reporting to the UNFCCC Secretariat on an annual basis so that the progress being made is consolidated and tracked;
681. Acknowledge the role of non-State actors in follow up of the GST outcome;
682. Promote cross-level and cross-functional collaboration among UNFCCC entities, organizations, (and if outside UNFCCC processes are to be encouraged then they must respect the UNFCCC process); including determination of involvement of non-Party and other stakeholders at the national, regional, local, and private sector / corporate levels;
683. Invite Parties and NPS to ensure accountability on the status of actions and commitments that have been made through NPS initiatives, taking into account the work of the UNSG's "High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities" and of the High-Level Champions;

684. Invite and engage stakeholders from all levels of society (including private sector, local communities, non-state actors, youth, Indigenous Peoples as rightsholders) to further align their actions and initiatives with Paris Agreement long-term goals and implement GST1 recommendations and commitments in their work going forward;
685. Invite NPS for further efforts to accelerate the uptake of key transformative opportunities/solutions based on GST1 results, including through the Global Climate Action Agenda, to implement GST1 recommendations and commitments in their work going forward, including to support NDC and LT-LEDS planning and implementation processes as well as Adaptation Communications and National Adaptation Plans and strategies, in line with outcomes on the GGA framework, and to take forward relevant sectoral and financial initiatives;
686. Invite the High-Level Champions to incentivize international cooperation for climate action and support and boost relevant initiatives, partnerships and launch new initiatives where gaps exist taking into account the findings of the latest Yearbook of Global Climate Action;
687. Invite the research community to address the knowledge needs identified during GST1;
688. Call for further research to better understand which impacts are reversible and which are irreversible. In particular, more understanding is needed on how to avoid and respond to tipping points, such as glacier melt, melting permafrost (which also risks releasing large amounts of CH₄) and forest dieback;
689. Call on the scientific community, and particularly the IPCC, to address knowledge gaps, in particular on the risks and impacts related to threshold in viability, namely through a better understanding of tipping points in the global climate system, and their consequences for adaptation and mitigation action, as well as to assess future regional and global impacts from the cryosphere and oceans;
690. Strengthen biocultural heritage and traditional knowledge of the indigenous peoples;
691. Give due consideration to the recommendations of the 2018 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, the three IPCC Working Group Reports, and the 2023 IPCC AR6 Synthesis Report;
692. Support efforts to address the gaps between current efforts and science-based pathways that can prevent the crossing of additional, essentially permanent thresholds – especially in the cryosphere – in the coming five-year period;
693. Continue to address closing existing gaps in the global climate observing system, particularly in developing countries.

F. Other issues for consideration

694. Nearly all Parties expressed support for a global stocktake outcome that is balanced and reflects both an assessment of collective progress towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, also referred to as “backward looking” and recommended measures, priorities for action, responses for action and support including opportunities, also referred to as “forward-looking”.
695. In defining what constitutes backward looking elements, some Parties equated an ambitious, equitable and balanced outcome as one that recognises pre-2020 implementation gaps while few Parties highlighted that pre-2020 gaps are outside the scope of the global stocktake. All Parties affirmed that collectively, the world is not on track to achieve the Paris Agreement long term goals; both during pre-2020 pledges and subsequent implementation has been insufficient.
696. Near all Parties made reference to a global stocktake CMA 5 decision and many Parties outlined components and nature of the global stocktake outcome as to include the following:

(a) **CMA 5 decision** - A negotiated CMA decision text would be central in providing guidance to Parties, non-Party stakeholders and the institutions, including work programmes under the convention. The CMA 5 decision should pave the way for the establishment of a robust follow-up mechanism, ensuring rigorous scrutiny of the findings of the first global stocktake and strongly urge Parties to incorporate the technical insights garnered from the global stocktake into their NDC preparations, thus infusing these commitments with real-world efficacy.

(b) **Political Declaration** - Supplementary to the CMA 5 decision, to be facilitated by the high-level committee, that would provide high level political signals to stakeholders including non-state actors to contribute towards ambitious climate action. The declaration would further acknowledge undertakings and efforts by non-Party stakeholders and reflect the role of youth, children, indigenous communities and wider stakeholders engaged in advancing climate action.

(c) **Technical Annex** - In line with 19/CMA.1 paragraph 13, the annex will reflect opportunities, challenges, lessons and good practices including possible measures for enhancing action. It would also map the existing landscape of enablers not only within the UNFCCC but also beyond its scope; effectively identifying gaps and emerging opportunities. Such details and information would provide parties with concrete technical guidelines and reference to update NDC compatible with findings and outcomes of the technical assessment phase of the first global stocktake.

697. Few Parties emphasized that the global stocktake decision gives primacy to the goals as set out in Articles 2.1. a-c and 7.1 of the Paris Agreement; therefore, the outline considers adaptation, mitigation and means of implementation as the thematic areas of action. Further, a few Parties also cited that the scope of the global stocktake process includes all goals of the Paris Agreement, understood in terms of Articles 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

698. Many Parties accentuated on a global stocktake outcome with intrinsic capabilities to inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support and in accordance with the relevant provisions of the agreement. The outcome should provide concrete outcomes to inform the updating and enhancing action, collective commitment to promote international cooperation, and facilitate national level, domestic action with the highest possible ambition. In doing so, some Parties reiterated that the pursuit of ambition, to be done in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement, remains in harmony with the principle of CBDR-RC and upholds multilateralism.

699. In informing NDCs, consistently raising ambition and accelerating action towards the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, near all Parties highlighted the role and link of the global stocktake outcome to the enhanced transparency framework. Some Parties highlighted that a well-functioning ETF would facilitate effective tracking of progress and outcomes of the first global stocktake. Further, many Parties welcomed a GST decision with a clear roadmap for the period after 2023, to implement the recommendations and offer guidance for monitoring and accountability.

700. Some non-Party stakeholders reiterated that the global stocktake decision includes; workshops with peer review to support preparations of NDCs and strengthening ambition; recommendations to strengthen the UNFCCC systems building on current provisions for accountability. Some non-Party stakeholders further recommended that the political declaration should include signatures by all Parties or groups of Parties, demonstrating commitment and further an outcome on initiatives and partnerships coordinated by the COP 28 presidency with the various stakeholders including the high-level climate champions.

701. A few non-Party stakeholders submissions emphasized that the Joint Contact Group (JCG) should take this opportunity to issue an invitation for reflections on the organization of GST 1, with a view to improving and informing the organization of GST 2; urged the JCG to issue requests or invitations to relevant constituted bodies and mechanisms serving under the Paris Agreement, as well as Parties and non-Party stakeholders, to strengthen their support to Parties taking into consideration the outputs of the global stocktake.